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Judging the Flood of Litigation 
Marin K. Levy† 
The Supreme Court has increasingly considered a particular kind of argu-
ment: that it should avoid reaching decisions that would “open the floodgates of 
litigation.” Despite its frequent invocation, there has been little scholarly explora-
tion of what a floodgates argument truly means, and even less discussion of its 
normative basis. This Article addresses both subjects, demonstrating for the first 
time the scope and surprising variation of floodgates arguments, as well as uncov-
ering their sometimes-shaky foundations. Relying on in-depth case studies from a 
wide array of issue areas, the Article shows that floodgates arguments primarily 
have been used to protect three institutions: coordinate branches of government, the 
state courts, and the federal courts themselves. In the former two instances, the 
Court’s desire to avoid floods is supported by independent constitutional principles 
and doctrine, including separation of powers and federalism, lending these kinds 
of arguments a prima facie legitimacy. With regard to the final instance, however, 
the Court has relied on floodgates arguments solely to protect itself and the rest of 
the federal judiciary from what it sees as an excessive workload, raising difficult 
questions about separation of powers and the measures courts can take to ensure 
their ability to administer justice. The Article concludes by arguing for a presump-
tion against court-centered floodgates arguments—positing that the Court should 
let the lower courts rely on alternative mechanisms, such as procedural rules and 
case-management techniques, to handle new claims instead of closing the court-
house doors to stave them off altogether. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Over the past several decades, the Supreme Court has in-
creasingly considered a particular kind of argument: that it 
should avoid reaching decisions that would “open the floodgates 
of litigation.”1 Of the sixty or so cases in which the justices ex-
plicitly raised or addressed a so-called floodgates argument,2 
fourteen came between 2010 and 2013 alone.3 And yet, despite 
 
 1 Although a floodgates argument appears in the Supreme Court as early as 1908 
in Ex parte Young, 209 US 123, 166–67 (1908), the Court does not appear to consider this 
kind of argument consistently until the mid-1940s. See, for example, De Beers Consoli-
dated Mines, Ltd v United States, 325 US 212, 225 (1945) (Douglas dissenting); United 
States v South-Eastern Underwriters Association, 322 US 533, 583 (1944) (Stone dissent-
ing). That said, floodgates arguments have existed outside the Court for far longer. With-
in the United States, the earliest recorded use of the phrase “the floodgates of litigation” 
comes from Whitbeck v Cook, 15 Johnson Cas 483, 491 (NY Sup Ct 1818). See also Adam 
Freedman, The Party of the First Part: The Curious World of Legalese 73 (Henry Holt 
2007). Outside the United States, this kind of argument can be found in judicial opinions 
as early as the late 1700s. See Governor and Company of the British Cast Plate Manufac-
turers v Meredith, 100 Eng Rep 1306, 1307 (1792) (Kenyon) (“If this action could be 
maintained, every Turnpike Act, Paving Act and Navigation Act, would give rise to an 
infinity of actions.”).  
 2 For a brief discussion of how I determined the relevant set of cases, see note 31. 
 3 See McQuiggin v Perkins, 133 S Ct 1924, 1943 (2013) (Scalia dissenting); John-
son v Williams, 133 S Ct 1088, 1097 (2013); id at 1102 (Scalia concurring); Henderson v 
United States, 133 S Ct 1121, 1130 (2013); Arkansas Game and Fish Commission v Unit-
ed States, 133 S Ct 511, 521 (2012); Mohamad v Palestinian Authority, 132 S Ct 1702, 
1711 (2012) (Breyer concurring); Lafler v Cooper, 132 S Ct 1376, 1389–90 (2012); Mims v 
Arrow Financial Services, LLC, 132 S Ct 740, 753 (2012); Perry v New Hampshire, 132 S 
Ct 716, 737–38 (2012) (Sotomayor dissenting); Connick v Thompson, 131 S Ct 1350, 1382 
n 17 (2011) (Ginsburg dissenting); Skinner v Switzer, 131 S Ct 1289, 1299–1300 (2011); 
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the increased prominence of this line of reasoning, its normative 
justification has been highly contested. Indeed, recent cases 
show the justices vacillating between providing assurances that 
their decision will not result in a deluge of new claims,4 and ac-
cusing each other of being driven by an improper desire to stave 
off such a deluge.5 In the words of Justice Ginsburg from her 
dissent in the 2007 case Wilkie v Robbins,6 “The ‘floodgates’ ar-
gument the Court today embraces has been rehearsed and re-
jected before.”7 
It is no wonder that members of the Court have wrestled 
with questions of whether and when to rely upon floodgates rea-
soning. In its most distilled form, a floodgates argument is an 
argument against a particular decision on the ground that it will 
lead to a large number of new claims.8 At first blush, that the 
 
McDonald v City of Chicago, Illinois, 130 S Ct 3020, 3115 (2010) (Stevens dissenting); 
Jerman v Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich LPA, 130 S Ct 1605, 1620 (2010); 
Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, PA v Allstate Insurance Co, 130 S Ct 1431, 1472 n 14 
(2010) (Ginsburg dissenting); Padilla v Kentucky, 130 S Ct 1473, 1484–85 (2010). 
 4 See, for example, Mims, 132 S Ct at 753 (“Arrow’s floodgates argument assumes 
a shocking degree of noncompliance with the [Telephone Consumer Protection] Act and 
seems to us more imaginary than real.”) (quotation marks and citation omitted); Lafler, 
132 S Ct at 1389 (“Petitioner argues that implementing a remedy here will open the 
floodgates to litigation by defendants seeking to unsettle their convictions. Petitioner’s 
concern is misplaced.”); Padilla, 130 S Ct at 1484–85 (“We confronted a similar ‘flood-
gates’ concern in Hill . . . . A flood did not follow in that decision’s wake.”), citing Hill v 
Lockhart, 474 US 52, 58 (1985). 
 5 See, for example, Wilkie v Robbins, 551 US 537, 569 (2007) (Ginsburg concurring 
in part and dissenting in part) (“[T]he Court rejects his claim, for it fears the conse-
quences. Allowing Robbins to pursue this suit, the Court maintains, would open the 
floodgates to a host of unworthy suits ‘in every sphere of legitimate governmental action 
affecting property interests.’”); Schriro v Landrigan, 550 US 465, 499 (2007) (Stevens 
dissenting) (“In the end, the Court’s decision can only be explained by its increasingly 
familiar effort to guard the floodgates of litigation.”); Vieth v Jubelirer, 541 US 267, 326 
n 14 (2004) (Stevens dissenting) (“The plurality’s reluctance to recognize the justiciabil-
ity of partisan gerrymanders seems driven in part by a fear that recognizing such claims 
will give rise to a flood of litigation.”).  
 6 551 US 537 (2007). 
 7 Id at 577 (Ginsburg concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
 8 See, for example, Ellie Margolis, Closing the Floodgates: Making Persuasive Poli-
cy Arguments in Appellate Briefs, 62 Mont L Rev 59, 73 (2001) (defining a “‘floodgates of 
litigation’ argument” as one that “asserts that a proposed rule, if adopted, will inundate 
the court with lawsuits”). 
 To be clear, the Court of course routinely considers arguments that touch on con-
cerns about future litigation, such as parade of horribles and slippery slope arguments. 
See notes 36–37. For my own part, I see the consideration of these arguments often as 
attempts by the justices to test their legal principles through a kind of reflective equilib-
rium—seeing whether they can support the same principle when faced with a different 
set of facts. In this way, unlike floodgates arguments, these other arguments are not con-
sequentialist. Regardless, a full examination of all Supreme Court arguments regarding 
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Court would try to hold back a flood of litigation seems reasona-
ble, particularly in an era in which the lower courts have been 
said to face “a crisis in volume.”9 And yet, as one plumbs deeper, 
the argument becomes increasingly problematic. Taken directly, 
this line of reasoning would have the Court consider as part of 
its substantive analysis the volume of litigation its decision 
might create. Members of the Court often repeat the famed 
phrase that “[t]he very essence of civil liberty certainly consists 
in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the 
laws, whenever he receives an injury.”10 Granting a floodgates 
argument implies that one’s “protection of the laws” depends, at 
least in part, on a speculation about how many others intend to 
claim that same protection. 
What therefore appears as a straightforward argument in 
fact brings with it a host of normative questions—questions that 
legal scholars for the most part have not answered, and indeed 
have not asked,11 even as some floodgates arguments have 
shaped substantive law.12 Is it ever appropriate for courts to con-
sider the effect their decision will have on the volume of litigation? 
 
future litigation is outside the scope of this Article; rather, the focus here is on those ar-
guments that appear to be particularly concerned with volume—namely, over the num-
ber of cases that any one decision might cause.  
 9 Scholars have used this particular phrase from the mid-1970s to today. See Dan-
iel J. Meador, Appellate Courts: Staff and Process in the Crisis of Volume 7–9 (West 
1974); Bert I. Huang, Lightened Scrutiny, 124 Harv L Rev 1109, 1112 (2011). 
 10 This phrase originated with Chief Justice Marshall. See Marbury v Madison, 5 
US (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803). Although Marbury itself presented an instance of a legal 
injury that did not result in a remedy from the Court, justices have frequently invoked 
the phrase in a literal way. See, for example, Alden v Maine, 527 US 706, 812 (1999) 
(Souter dissenting); Lujan v Defenders of Wildlife, 504 US 555, 606 (1992) (Blackmun 
dissenting); Bivens v Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 
US 388, 397 (1971); Baker v Carr, 369 US 186, 208 (1962).  
 11 The discussion of floodgates has received surprisingly little attention from legal 
academics. A limited number of scholars have discussed this line of argumentation in 
articles on other topics or in practical guides. See, for example, Susan Bandes, The Nega-
tive Constitution: A Critique, 88 Mich L Rev 2271, 2326–30 (1990) (discussing the flood-
gates argument in the context of affirmative and negative constitutional duties); Margo-
lis, 62 Mont L Rev at 73 (cited in note 8) (including information on floodgates arguments 
in a guide on writing appellate briefs). However, the only scholarship completely devoted 
to the topic of which I am aware is a thoughtful student comment. See generally Toby J. 
Stern, Comment, Federal Judges and Fearing the “Floodgates of Litigation”, 6 U Pa J 
Con L 377 (2003). 
 12 To be clear, I am not claiming that floodgates arguments have been dispositive in 
all or even most of the cases in which they have been raised. Rather, I am asserting that 
this kind of reasoning has directly impacted the outcome of at least a few key cases. See, 
for example, Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc v Darue Engineering & Manufacturing, 
545 US 308, 319–20 (2005); Wilkie, 551 US at 562. And it has at least been a relevant 
factor in many of the cases discussed in Parts I, II, and III.  
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If so, what number of forecasted filings is sufficient to justify, 
say, deciding against the creation of a new private right of action 
or against reviewing a set of cases? Does it matter whether a 
high percentage of the anticipated claims would be frivolous? 
Does it matter just how inundated the courts, or other govern-
mental institutions, are with other cases? 
Yet to begin to have purchase on these questions, one first 
needs to understand how floodgates arguments are made and to 
what end. Despite the fact that the Court refers to the “flood-
gates argument” as if it had a singular meaning13 and uses con-
sistent imagery to invoke it—a flood,14 a deluge,15 a rainfall,16 or 
even an avalanche17—not all such arguments are the same. A 
careful exposition of floodgates arguments reveals that they are 
in fact quite varied, depending largely upon the government in-
stitution—and the dynamic between the judiciary and that insti-
tution—that would be affected by an increase in litigation. 
 
 13 See, for example, Wilkie, 551 US at 577 (Ginsburg concurring in part and dis-
senting in part) (“The ‘floodgates’ argument the Court today embraces has been re-
hearsed and rejected before.”). It is worth noting that on at least one occasion, the Court 
has used the phrase to mean something akin to a slippery slope argument. See Morris v 
Gressette, 432 US 491, 506 n 23 (1977): 
Mr. Justice Marshall’s dissent opens with a “floodgates” argument: If there is 
no judicial review when the Attorney General misunderstands his legal duty, 
there also will be no judicial review when at sometime in the future the Attor-
ney General bargains acquiescence in a discriminatory change in a covered 
State’s voting laws in return for that State’s electoral votes.  
The discussion here includes only those arguments centered on the potential for in-
creased litigation. Additionally, at least among lower courts, there have been instances 
in which a floodgates argument is invoked in a positive manner, with the court welcom-
ing a potential increase in litigation on a particular subject (with thanks to Professor 
Richard Lazarus for this point). See, for example, Calvert Cliffs’ Coordinating Commis-
sion v United States Atomic Energy Commission, 449 F2d 1109, 1111 (DC Cir 1971). In 
the Supreme Court, I only found cases in which a flood was perceived to be a threat; as 
such, the discussion here only focuses on the concerns—and not the promise—of poten-
tial litigation.  
 14 See, for example, Bowen v Michigan Academy of Family Physicians, 476 US 667, 
680 n 11 (1986) (“We do not believe that our decision will open the floodgates to millions 
of Part B Medicare claims. . . . We observed no flood of litigation in the first 20 years of 
operation of Part B of the Medicare program, and we seriously doubt that we will be in-
undated in the future.”).  
 15 See, for example, Davis v Passman, 442 US 228, 248 (1979) (dismissing the lower 
court’s concern of “deluging federal courts with claims”). 
 16 See, for example, Skinner, 131 S Ct at 1299 (“[N]o evidence . . . shows any litiga-
tion flood or even rainfall.”).  
 17 See, for example, Bivens, 403 US at 430 (Blackmun dissenting) (criticizing the 
Court’s decision for “open[ing] the door for another avalanche of new federal cases”). 
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To begin, the Court has consistently considered floodgates 
arguments in the context of interbranch concerns. With regard 
to the executive branch, justices have suggested that their deci-
sions must take into account the ways in which an increase in 
certain kinds of litigation would impinge upon the ability of fed-
eral agents18 or even the President19 to perform official obliga-
tions. With regard to the legislative branch, justices have raised 
concerns that a particular statutory reading might lead to a del-
uge of new claims, a result that would suggest the Court had 
disregarded congressional intent20 or even usurped the legisla-
tive function by expanding its own jurisdiction.21 In both sets of 
cases, the primary concern is not that the federal courts will be 
inundated with an increase in claims but rather that an increase 
in claims would cause, or be evidence of, a problem for a coordi-
nate branch of government. 
Similarly, the Court has considered floodgates arguments 
that are part of larger “intersystemic”22 concerns—those regard-
ing the balance between the federal and state court systems. In 
these cases, the threat of a flood is problematic because it would 
signal federal aggrandizement—that the Court had taken cases 
from the state courts that belong in state court23 or that the 
state courts would be burdened with a host of new claims and 
attendant obligations.24 As in the interbranch context, the con-
cern here is not over the volume of cases per se but rather how 
an increase in cases would affect another set of government in-
stitutions and the federal courts’ dynamic with those institutions. 
In the majority of cases, however, the justices have consid-
ered floodgates arguments that are animated by volume-related 
concerns for the federal judiciary, so that they may keep their 
own heads (and those of other federal judges) above water. In 
this set of cases, members of the Court argue for a particular de-
cision to avoid creating or contributing to what they see to be an 
excessive workload in what might best be understood as a form 
 
 18 See id (Blackmun dissenting). 
 19 See Clinton v Jones, 520 US 681, 722–23 (1997) (Breyer concurring). 
 20 See De Beers Consolidated Mines, 325 US at 223–25 (Douglas dissenting).  
 21 See Solem v Helm, 463 US 277, 314–15 (1983) (Burger dissenting).  
 22 Abbe R. Gluck, Intersystemic Statutory Interpretation: Methodology as “Law” and 
the Erie Doctrine, 120 Yale L J 1898, 1990–97 (2011). 
 23 See United States v Maze, 414 US 395, 407 (1974) (Burger dissenting).  
 24 M.L.B. v S.L.J., 519 US 102, 129–30 (1996) (Thomas dissenting) (describing how, 
as a result of the Court’s decision, state courts would be required to furnish free trial 
transcripts in numerous kinds of cases).  
 2013] Judging the Flood of Litigation 1013 
 
of “court-centered prudentialism.”25 Specifically, the justices oc-
casionally suggest or even hold that a cause of action must go 
unrecognized,26 or a case unreviewed,27 because to do otherwise 
would invite too many new filings into the federal courts. More 
frequently, the majority asserts that its holding is sound be-
cause it will not lead to an increase in claims,28 or the dissent ac-
cuses the majority of being improperly motivated by a desire to 
avoid such an increase.29 In essence, this kind of floodgates ar-
gument is concerned with case volume, and how that volume 
will affect the federal courts themselves. 
Given that the Court considers floodgates arguments in 
such fundamentally different ways, these arguments must be 
evaluated contextually, not categorically.30 This Article therefore 
begins by analyzing how floodgates arguments actually function 
in the Supreme Court.31 Following other scholarship that has 
 
 25 See Neil S. Siegel, Prudentialism in McDonald v. City of Chicago, 6 Duke J Const 
L & Pub Pol 16, 16–17 (2010). 
 26 See Wilkie, 551 US at 555–61. 
 27 See Vieth, 541 US at 326 n 14 (Stevens dissenting).  
 28 See note 4.  
 29 See note 5.  
 30 Consider Note, Satisfying the “Appearance of Justice”: The Uses of Apparent Im-
propriety in Constitutional Adjudication, 117 Harv L Rev 2708 (2004) (suggesting that 
apparent-impropriety concerns should be determined contextually rather than 
categorically). 
 31 To find the universe of cases containing floodgates arguments in the Supreme 
Court, I first ran a search in Westlaw in the winter of 2013 for all Supreme Court cases 
containing the word “flood,” “floodgate,” “floodgates,” “deluge,” or “avalanche”—which 
resulted in approximately 650 cases. I reviewed the operative language in each case to 
determine which ones were relevant, and narrowed the pool to approximately sixty cas-
es. A research assistant then conducted tailored searches (such as “floodgates” within 
five words of “cases” or “litigation”) as a check against my own winnowing of the cases. 
Second, recognizing that not all cases that rely upon floodgates reasoning use the explicit 
language of floodgates, I ran another series of searches designed to capture at least some 
of the cases in which the Court discussed the impact a decision would have on case vol-
ume (such as “staggering” or “tremendous” within five words of “cases” or “litigation”). 
Finally, I ran searches using certain excerpts from what appeared to be key opinions 
that addressed floodgates arguments (such as Justice Harlan’s concurrence in Bivens 
and Justice Jackson’s concurrence in Brown v Allen). See Bivens, 403 US at 410 (Harlan 
concurring); Brown v Allen, 344 US 443, 537 (1953) (Jackson concurring). Including 
these additional searches, the total number of relevant cases that I located was just 
above sixty. I performed this same set of searches in the summer of 2013 and added one 
new case from October Term 2012 (McQuiggin v Perkins, 133 S Ct 1924 (2013)).  
 To be clear, I do not purport that every Supreme Court case that mentions case vol-
ume as a concern is captured in this set; for example, Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc v 
Thompson, 478 US 804 (1986), or, more recently, University of Texas Southwestern Med-
ical Center v Nassar, 133 S Ct 2517 (2013), could have been included in this analysis but 
were not captured by my search. Rather, the claim is simply that I have captured a 
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focused on a particular kind of argument in legal discourse,32 
this Article’s initial goal is to unpack the argument in ques-
tion—determining how floodgates arguments are employed, for 
what purposes, and what impact they have had in shaping doc-
trine. As the discussion above indicates, the answers to those 
questions are varied and important. These answers also enable 
the second major project of the Article, which is to begin to eval-
uate the normative basis underlying floodgates arguments—
whether and under what circumstances they should play a role 
in judicial decision making. 
The first three Parts of the Article delineate the primary us-
es of this consequentialist line of reasoning, based on why the 
reasoning is being invoked and which branch of government will 
be affected by the consequences.33 Part I examines cases in 
which the Court considers floodgates arguments in the service of 
a larger argument about interbranch concerns. Specifically, Part 
I.A focuses on judicial-executive interactions, and Part I.B turns 
to judicial-legislative interactions. Part II considers floodgates 
arguments as they implicate intersystemic concerns. Part II.A 
examines cases in which the Court is concerned about taking too 
many cases from the state courts, and Part II.B discusses the 
near opposite—cases in which the Court is concerned about 
flooding the state courts with too many cases and related obliga-
tions. Part III then assesses cases in which the Court invokes 
floodgates out of concern for the judiciary itself. This Part ex-
plores how this reasoning has been raised in particular lines of 
 
sizeable number of cases that address this kind of reasoning, including most if not all 
explicit floodgates cases.  
 32 For a prime example of this type of scholarly literature, see generally Eugene 
Volokh, The Mechanisms of the Slippery Slope, 116 Harv L Rev 1026 (2003) (providing a 
detailed exposition of slippery slope arguments). For related scholarship, see generally 
Russell B. Korobkin and Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the 
Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 Cal L Rev 1051 (2000) (exploring 
the use of the rationality assumption in legal scholarship); Gluck, 120 Yale L J 1898 (cit-
ed in note 22) (analyzing the Erie doctrine in a decade’s worth of federal and state court 
cases).  
 33 As with any time one creates a taxonomy to better understand a set, one could 
rely on a different organizing principle (just as if one were examining a collection of vari-
ous shapes in different colors, one could group the items by shape or by color, etc.). Re-
garding the set of floodgates cases, one could alternatively create a schematic that fo-
cused on the task the Court was performing in each case—say, constitutional 
interpretation, statutory interpretation, or federal common lawmaking. For my own 
part, I think the affected institution is a critical component of understanding floodgates 
arguments and so focus the discussion accordingly. That said, I do try to note the kind of 
task the Court was engaging in throughout the discussion and raise the task, where I 
think relevant, in the normative discussion in Part IV.  
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cases, including Bivens, habeas, and prisoner appeals. In these 
and other areas of law, the Court seeks to avoid increasing the 
number of claims coming into the federal courts—often frivolous 
cases but also cases in general. 
Part IV then frames and begins to answer the normative 
questions of if and when the Court should employ this line of 
reasoning. I suggest that the concerns behind the first two cate-
gories of floodgates arguments are familiar ones, with ties to 
constitutional principles—including separation of powers and 
federalism—and key lines of doctrine—including qualified im-
munity and abstention. Although reasonable minds may disa-
gree about how much weight to accord these floodgates argu-
ments, their invocation generally is not problematic per se. 
Whether the Court can properly shape substantive law 
based on caseload for caseload’s sake—a matter of judicial 
“self-interest[ ]”34—is a more complicated question. Whereas con-
cerns about interbranch and intersystemic relationships have a 
firm footing in various areas of law, concerns about workload 
stand on shakier ground. Accordingly, I argue that anxieties 
about workload are best addressed through other means, such 
as through the use of procedural rules and case-management 
practices.35 Inviting a flood of new claims into federal court may 
well be dangerous. But without sound legal footing, it is more 
dangerous still to divert a line of cases where it would not oth-
erwise flow. 
I.  INTERBRANCH CONCERNS 
The phrase “opening the floodgates” has become some-
thing of a legal trope, like “slippery slope”36 or “parade of 
 
 34 See Hudson v McMillian, 503 US 1, 15 (1992) (Blackmun concurring).  
 35 I use the term “case-management practices” to describe administrative means 
that the federal courts of appeals employ to manage their dockets, such as decreasing the 
percentage of cases that receive oral argument and result in published opinions. See, for 
example, Marin K. Levy, The Mechanics of Federal Appeals: Uniformity and Case Man-
agement in the Circuit Courts, 61 Duke L J 315, 320–25 (2011). 
 36 See, for example, Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, PA v Allstate Insurance Co, 
130 S Ct 1431, 1465–66 n 5 (2010) (Ginsburg dissenting): 
Shady Grove projects that a dispensation in favor of Allstate would require 
“courts in all diversity class actions . . . [to] look to state rules and decisional 
law rather than to Rule 23 . . . in making their class certification decisions.” 
This slippery-slope projection is both familiar and false. Cf. R. Bork, The 
Tempting of America 169 (1990) (“Judges and lawyers live on the slippery slope 
of analogies; they are not supposed to ski it to the bottom.”). 
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horribles.”37 Judges and scholars tend to use the phrase as if it 
had a single, stable meaning.38 But in fact, these arguments vary 
considerably depending upon the government institution—and 
the dynamic between the judiciary and that institution—that 
would be affected by a flood of new cases. 
 
(citations omitted). For a broader discussion of slippery slope arguments, see generally 
Volokh, 116 Harv L Rev 1026 (cited in note 32). 
 37 See, for example, Eastern Associated Coal Corp v United Mine Workers of Ameri-
ca, District 17, 531 US 57, 69 (2000) (Scalia concurring) (“One can, of course, summon up 
a parade of horribles, such as an arbitration award ordering an airline to reinstate an 
alcoholic pilot who somehow escapes being grounded by force of law.”); Goldman v Wein-
berger, 475 US 503, 519 (1986) (Brennan dissenting):  
[T]he Air Force argues that while Dr. Goldman describes his yarmulke as an 
“unobtrusive” addition to his uniform, obtrusiveness is a purely relative, 
standardless judgment. The Government notes that while a yarmulke might 
not seem obtrusive to a Jew, neither does a turban to a Sikh, a saffron robe to a 
Satchidananda Ashram-Integral Yogi, nor dreadlocks to a Rastafarian. If the 
Court were to require the Air Force to permit yarmulkes, the service must also 
allow all of these other forms of dress and grooming. The Government dangles 
before the Court a classic parade of horribles . . . . 
Most recently, the parade of horribles was recast as “the broccoli horrible” by dissenting 
Justices in October Term 2011’s decision on the Affordable Care Act. See National Fed-
eration of Independent Business v Sebelius, 132 S Ct 2566, 2624 (2012) (Ginsburg con-
curring in part and dissenting in part). 
 38 For recent judicial examples, see Geinosky v City of Chicago, 675 F3d 743, 748 
(7th Cir 2012) (“We do not credit the city’s assertion that allowing this suit will open the 
floodgates to a wave of ordinary malicious prosecution (or other tort cases) brought as 
constitutional class-of-one claims.”); United States v City of Loveland, Ohio, 621 F3d 465, 
472 (6th Cir 2010) (“Because federal courts are already charged with enforcing the Clean 
Water Act . . . the district court’s exercise of jurisdiction over this matter would not open 
the floodgates of litigation that might overwhelm the federal courts.”); Arar v Ashcroft, 
585 F3d 559, 629–30 n 7 (2d Cir 2009) (Pooler dissenting): 
Because plaintiffs must meet a plausibility standard for claims against federal 
officials under Ashcroft v. Iqbal, I am not concerned that subjecting federal of-
ficials to liability under the [Torture Victim Protection Act] would open the 
floodgates to a wave of meritless litigation. 
(citation omitted). 
 For recent scholarly examples, see F. Andrew Hessick, Probabilistic Standing, 106 
Nw U L Rev 55, 89 (2012) (“A fourth objection to expanding standing to all risks of injury 
is that it would open the floodgates of litigation and overburden the federal dockets.”); 
Jonathan Remy Nash, On the Efficient Deployment of Rules and Standards to Define 
Federal Jurisdiction, 65 Vand L Rev 509, 555 (2012) (“One might be concerned . . . about 
opening the floodgates of federal court litigation. The argument that there are simply too 
many federal question cases for the federal courts to handle is somewhat responsive to 
this point.”); Richard Lazarus, The National Environmental Policy Act in the U.S. Su-
preme Court: A Reappraisal and a Peek behind the Curtains, 100 Georgetown L J 1507, 
1516 (2012) (“In the context of litigation, a ‘flood’ is normally treated as something to be 
avoided—it is common to argue that a particular legal theory should be rejected because 
its embrace would ‘open the floodgates of litigation.’”). 
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Chief among these institutions are the judiciary’s own coor-
dinate branches of the federal government: the executive and 
the legislature. Indeed, in quite a few cases the Supreme Court 
has considered floodgates arguments that address an inter-
branch concern. The concerns themselves vary, depending on the 
branch involved. In the context of cases involving the executive, 
the worry has been that a flood of litigation would burden execu-
tive branch actors—be it federal agents or the president himself. 
In the context of the legislature, the concern is substantially dif-
ferent. There, the worry is not that a deluge of new claims would 
encumber Congress but rather that it would serve as evidence 
that the Court had disregarded legislative intent in construing a 
particular statute or had even usurped the legislative function 
altogether. Despite these specific variations, the larger point is 
that the Court has relied upon floodgates arguments to express 
concerns about how an increase in claims would affect its rela-
tionship with a coordinate branch of government. 
A. Burdening the Executive Branch 
The justices have occasionally entertained, and even in-
voked sua sponte, floodgates arguments when considering the 
impact their decisions will have on executive branch officials. 
Although litigation always absorbs defendants’ time and re-
sources, members of the Court have suggested that these costs 
may be particularly problematic when the defendants are execu-
tive officials, because of both the importance of their work and 
the troubling potential for judicial micromanaging of executive 
time and functions. These concerns are perhaps most prominent 
in cases involving civil suits against executive officials, and a 
close reading of those cases demonstrates both the form and 
weight of floodgates considerations. 
One of the first examples of a floodgates argument used to 
express a concern about burdening the executive comes from 
Bivens v Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of 
Narcotics39 in 1971. In Bivens, the Court considered whether a 
citizen has a cause of action against federal agents who violated 
his Fourth Amendment right to be free from an unreasonable 
search and seizure.40 Although a majority answered that ques-
tion in the affirmative, several Justices dissented on the ground 
 
 39 403 US 388 (1971). 
 40 Id at 389–90.  
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that Congress, not the Court, had the authority to create a new 
cause of action.41 For this reason Bivens is often perceived as a 
case that raises judicial-legislative concerns.42 And yet, the 
floodgates argument that was ultimately put forward by a third 
dissenter expressed a concern about a different branch of gov-
ernment: unduly burdening the executive. 
In his dissent, Justice Blackmun objected on the ground 
that the Court’s decision would “open[ ] the door for another ava-
lanche of new federal cases.”43 Specifically, he argued that after 
Bivens, “[w]henever a suspect imagines, or chooses to assert, 
that a Fourth Amendment right has been violated, he will now 
immediately sue the federal officer in federal court.”44 Justice 
Blackmun envisioned federal agents being burdened with a bar-
rage of litigation, thereby making it all the more difficult for 
them to carry out their official duties.45 There was also an indi-
rect fear that the very threat of a litigation avalanche would 
cause agents to alter appropriate behavior out of a broad fear of 
being sued.46 These concerns were particularly pronounced at 
“this time of our history”47—a time when law enforcement offi-
cials were perceived to be under great strain.48 
Significantly, this early example of a floodgates argument is 
not concerned with flooding the courts with cases. Rather, the 
potential flood here is one that would burden executive branch 
 
 41 See id at 411 (Burger dissenting); id at 427–28 (Black dissenting). See also 
James E. Pfander and David Baltmanis, Rethinking Bivens: Legitimacy and Constitu-
tional Adjudication, 98 Georgetown L J 117, 117–18 (2009).  
 42 See, for example, Anya Bernstein, Congressional Will and the Role of the Execu-
tive in Bivens Actions: What Is Special about Special Factors, 45 Ind L Rev 719, 729 
(2012) (describing the “common understanding of Bivens’s central problem” to be “one of 
the separation of judicial from legislative powers”).  
 43 Bivens, 403 US at 430 (Blackmun dissenting).  
 44 Id (Blackmun dissenting).  
 45 See id (Blackmun dissenting) (“This will tend to stultify proper law enforcement 
and to make the day’s labor for the honest and conscientious officer even more onerous 
and more critical.”). 
 46 This view was expressed by Justice Black in his dissenting opinion. Id at 429 
(Black dissenting) (“There is also a real danger that such suits might deter officials from 
the proper and honest performance of their duties.”).  
 47 Bivens, 403 US at 430 (Blackmun dissenting).  
 48 Just prior to Bivens, the United States had experienced a rise in crime rates. See 
Department of Justice, Uniform Crime Reporting Statistics (Mar 29, 2010), online at 
http://www.ucrdatatool.gov/Search/Crime/State/RunCrimeStatebyState.cfm (visited Sept 
10, 2013) (reporting that both the violent crime rate and the property crime rate more 
than doubled between 1960 and 1970); Carol S. Steiker, Book Review, Capital Punish-
ment and Contingency, 125 Harv L Rev 760, 769 (2012) (noting the “rising crime rates 
during the 1960s”). 
 2013] Judging the Flood of Litigation 1019 
 
officials. What is also significant about Bivens is that, rather 
than dismissing the validity of the concern, the majority tried to 
refute the possibility that an avalanche would ensue. Justice 
Brennan, writing for the Court, cited a survey of “comparable 
actions against state officers” and found only fifty-three reported 
cases in seventeen years that survived a motion to dismiss.49 
While it is unclear whether this rejoinder sufficiently addresses 
Justice Blackmun’s floodgates argument,50 what is clear is that 
the majority thought that argument was important enough to 
warrant a response. 
Federal agents are not the only executive officials the Court 
has considered protecting from floods; the Court has also consid-
ered such arguments in the context of how litigation would af-
fect the president. The primary example of this concern comes 
from Clinton v Jones,51 in which the Court considered, inter alia, 
whether the federal courts must stay private actions against a 
sitting President until he is no longer in office.52 Part of Presi-
dent Bill Clinton’s argument was that if the Court did not stay 
private actions against him, he would be flooded with cases, 
which would severely hinder his ability to perform his official 
functions.53 
The invocation of this argument is perhaps unsurprising, 
but the Court’s response to it is especially interesting, for it il-
luminates the justices’ view of whether floods are valid concerns, 
and also how parties can go about demonstrating their would-be 
existence. As a general matter, there are two main responses to 
a floodgates argument. First, as in Bivens, the Court can re-
spond internally and refute the claim that a flood will come.54 
Second, the Court can go outside of the argument and suggest 
that the existence of a deluge of new claims, or lack thereof, is 
not sufficient to determine the outcome of the case. In Jones, the 
Court did both. 
 
 49 Bivens, 403 US at 391 n 4. 
 50 Even assuming that past actions of a different kind could be used to forecast how 
many actions would arise under Bivens, the question is how many cases in general would 
require the time and resources of federal agents—a number that might extend beyond 
only those cases that survived a motion to dismiss. I return to this point in Part IV.C.  
 51 520 US 681 (1997).  
 52 Id at 697–98.  
 53 Id at 701–02 (“[P]etitioner contends that this particular case—as well as the po-
tential additional litigation that an affirmance of the Court of Appeals judgment might 
spawn—may impose an unacceptable burden on the President’s time and energy, and 
thereby impair the effective performance of his office.”). 
 54 See notes 49–50 and accompanying text. 
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The Court first attempted to calm the fears of flooding by 
suggesting that new claims were unlikely to arise, regardless of 
its decision. Looking to history, the Court noted that over the 
previous two centuries, only three sitting Presidents had faced 
suits for private actions.55 The Court concluded, “If the past is 
any indicator, it seems unlikely that a deluge of such litigation 
will ever engulf the Presidency.”56 
But the Court went one step farther by suggesting that such 
a burden on the executive, even if it existed, would not neces-
sarily establish a violation of the Constitution. As Justice Ste-
vens wrote, “Of greater significance, petitioner errs by presum-
ing that interactions between the Judicial Branch and the 
Executive, even quite burdensome interactions, necessarily rise 
to the level of constitutionally forbidden impairment of the Ex-
ecutive’s ability to perform its constitutionally mandated func-
tions.”57 The Court reasoned that if the federal courts may bur-
den the executive by reviewing the legality of the President’s 
official conduct, then the courts may review the legality of his 
unofficial conduct as well.58 Accordingly, the Court concluded 
that staying all private actions against the President until he 
had left office was unnecessary.59 
Yet Justice Breyer wrote separately to suggest that the 
Court’s holding should be seen as a threshold, not a bar. In the 
opening of his concurrence, Justice Breyer focused on the issue 
of future litigation, noting the possibility that the majority could 
be “wrong in predicting the future infrequency of private civil lit-
igation against sitting Presidents.”60 He went on to suggest that 
the Court had understated the “danger” of future litigation and 
 
 55 See Jones, 520 US at 702. 
 56 Id. As in Bivens, some slippage seems to exist between the floodgates argument 
and the Court’s response to it. After all, the President’s point was that allowing the suit 
to go forward would encourage more claims. See Brief for the Petitioner, Clinton v Jones, 
No 95-1853, *7–8 (filed Aug 8, 1996) (available on Westlaw at 1996 WL 448096): 
A personal damages action is bound to be burdensome and disruptive . . . . 
There is also no reason to believe that, if it is established that private damages 
actions against sitting Presidents may go forward, such suits would be rare. To 
the contrary, parties seeking publicity, partisan advantage or a quick settle-
ment will not forbear from using such litigation to advance their objectives. 
(emphasis added). As such, history would be an unreliable guide for predicting how 
many new claims would follow. I return to this point in Part IV.C.  
 57 Jones, 520 US at 702.  
 58 See id at 705.  
 59 See id at 705–06.  
 60 Id at 711 (Breyer concurring).  
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argued that the Court might have to eventually consider ways of 
avoiding “significant interference with the President’s ongoing 
discharge of his official responsibilities.”61 Justice Breyer’s sepa-
rate opinion therefore seemingly leaves the proverbial door 
slightly ajar by suggesting that if a future president could show 
that he was facing an onslaught of new private claims, the 
Court’s position might be different, or indeed might need to be 
different.62 
Bivens and Jones show that the justices have considered, 
and even themselves raised, floodgates arguments in support of 
the executive. The underlying concern in both cases is that the 
Court’s decision could lead to an onslaught of new claims, which 
would significantly hamper the ability of executive actors to per-
form their official obligations. 
As for outcomes, one might be tempted to cast both Bivens 
and Jones as cases in which the floodgates argument did not 
prevail and thus question how much weight the Court has been 
willing to accord such arguments. But as this Section has shown, 
a critical factor in both cases seemed to be that the majority did 
not believe that a flood was truly coming. Had the Court thought 
concerns about floods irrelevant, it would never have bothered to 
assure itself on that point in either case. Instead, the Justices 
recognized the danger of encumbering law enforcement or the 
 
 61 Jones, 520 US at 723–24 (Breyer concurring). Specifically, Justice Breyer sug-
gested that ordinary case-management principles might prove insufficient to handle pri-
vate civil lawsuits for damages “unless supplemented with a constitutionally based re-
quirement that district courts schedule proceedings” to avoid interfering with the 
President’s ability to perform his official functions. Id (Breyer concurring). 
 62 Indeed, not long after the decision came down, scholars suggested that the Court 
was wrong to be so optimistic, particularly regarding how costly allowing civil litigation 
would be for the executive. See Stuart Minor Benjamin, Stepping into the Same River 
Twice: Rapidly Changing Facts and the Appellate Process, 78 Tex L Rev 269, 281 n 45 
(1999) (noting how President Clinton subsequently argued that the Court “drastically 
underestimated” the extent to which civil litigation would burden the President’s time 
and how commentators suggested that events after Jones proved the prediction to be 
“flatly wrong and even laughable”). Some even questioned whether the Court could ap-
propriately overrule Jones only a few years later. See, for example, Michael C. Dorf, The 
Supreme Court, 1997 Term—Foreword: The Limits of Socratic Deliberation, 112 Harv L 
Rev 4, 76 (1998). Professor Michael Dorf suggested that “the answer depends on whether 
one views the course of events as merely idiosyncratic rather than as a harbinger of like-
ly litigation against future Presidents.” Id. Perhaps most telling, the Court later, in 
Cheney v United States District Court for the District of Columbia, 542 US 367 (2004), 
“took back some of the ground it had given away” in Jones, as lower courts “were in-
structed to better protect internal executive branch deliberations from litigation.” Rich-
ard H. Pildes, The Supreme Court, 2003 Term—Foreword: The Constitutionalization of 
Democratic Politics, 118 Harv L Rev 29, 35–36 (2004) (citations omitted).  
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president with a vast number of cases, and concluded that no 
such danger was present. There is reason to think, particularly 
in light of Justice Breyer’s concurrence in Jones, that, if the Court 
had perceived a high burden, it would have acted differently. 
B. Encroaching upon the Legislative Branch 
In a second category of cases, the Court has considered 
floodgates arguments in the context of the relationship between 
the federal courts and Congress. In this category, the expressed 
concern is not that a flood of cases would burden officials from a 
coordinate branch of government, but rather that the potential 
flood would show a disregard for legislative intent or arrogation 
of power to the judiciary. 
With limited exceptions, Article III provides Congress the 
last word on the jurisdiction of the federal courts.63 Accordingly, 
questions about what claims can come into the courts often re-
duce to questions of congressional intent.64 Both litigants and 
justices frequently invoke images of floodgates to support argu-
ments about why particular classes of claims fall outside the leg-
islative grant of jurisdiction. Flood metaphors serve several dis-
tinct roles in this context. Forecasts of floods are sometimes used 
as evidence of the existence of a problem—a violation of congres-
sional intent—and sometimes as evidence of the practical extent 
of that problem. In a stronger vein, forecasts of floods are also 
used to suggest that the Court has usurped the legislative func-
tion by expanding federal court jurisdiction on its own. 
One of the starkest examples of a floodgates concern in the 
legislative-branch context comes from one of the earliest cas-
es to contain a floodgates argument: the 1945 case De Beers 
 
 63 See US Const Art III, § 2, cl 2. But for a thoughtful analysis of the limits of Con-
gress’s power to affect the Court’s jurisdiction, see Lawrence Gene Sager, The Supreme 
Court, 1981 Term—Foreword: Constitutional Limitations on Congress’ Authority to Regu-
late the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 95 Harv L Rev 17, 20–22 (1981). 
 64 See, for example, INS v St. Cyr, 533 US 289, 298 (2001) (“For the INS to prevail 
it must overcome both the strong presumption in favor of judicial review of administra-
tive action and the longstanding rule requiring a clear statement of congressional intent 
to repeal habeas jurisdiction.”); American National Red Cross v S.G., 505 US 247, 258 
(1992) (“Respondents also claim that language used in congressional charters enacted 
closely in time to the 1947 amendment casts doubt on congressional intent thereby to 
confer federal jurisdiction over cases involving the Red Cross.”); Merrell Dow Pharma-
ceuticals Inc v Thompson, 478 US 804, 810 (1986) (“[I]n exploring the outer reaches of 
§ 1331, determinations about federal jurisdiction require sensitive judgments about con-
gressional intent, judicial power, and the federal system.”).  
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Consolidated Mines, Ltd v United States,65 an antitrust case that 
came to the Supreme Court as an interlocutory appeal.66 The 
Supreme Court ultimately reversed the lower court’s ruling, but 
four Justices dissented on the ground that the Court should not 
have considered the appeal in the first place. Specifically, they 
argued that the case did not involve the kind of “extraordinary 
situation” that Congress intended to be subject to interlocutory 
appeal under the Expediting Act of 1903.67 The dissent went on 
to say that although one effect of the Act was that some poten-
tially erroneous interlocutory orders would not be reviewable, 
Congress made this tradeoff when it enacted the legislation and 
the Court “should respect it.”68 It then concluded with its own 
forecast: “The decision, if followed, will open the flood gates to 
review of interlocutory decrees. It circumvents the policy of Con-
gress to restrict review in these cases to final judgments.”69 The 
majority did not respond to the dissent’s floodgates argument, 
but its significance is nonetheless easy to perceive. The dissent-
ing Justices in De Beers saw the Court as contravening congres-
sional intent, and the ensuing flood was invoked to prove that 
transgression. 
But statutory interpretation is not the only context in which 
a justice has invoked a floodgates argument to avoid encroach-
ing on what he or she sees as the legislative domain. Similar 
rhetoric surfaces even in cases involving constitutional rights. In 
Solem v Helm,70 for example, the Court held that the petitioner’s 
Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual pun-
ishment was violated when he was sentenced to life without 
 
 65 325 US 212 (1945).  
 66 Id at 215. The defendants were several foreign corporations who were charged 
with engaging in a conspiracy to monopolize commerce in gemstones in violation of the 
Sherman Antitrust Act, ch 647, 26 Stat 209 (1890), codified as amended at 15 USC § 1 et 
seq, and the Wilson-Gorman Tariff Act, ch 349, 28 Stat 509 (1894), codified as amended 
at 15 USC § 8 et seq. They were challenging a preliminary injunction to restrain them 
from selling any property within the United States or withdrawing any property from 
the United States until the district court resolved the case. De Beers Consolidated Mines, 
325 US at 214–15.  
 67 De Beers Consolidated Mines, 325 US at 223 (Douglas dissenting), citing Expedit-
ing Act of 1903, Pub L No 57-82, ch 544, 32 Stat 823, codified as amended at 15 USC 
§ 29. The purpose of the Expediting Act was to allow the Attorney General to seek “expe-
ditious treatment” of cases brought under the Sherman Act that were deemed to be of 
general public importance. Barak Y. Orbach, Antitrust and Pricing in the Motion Picture 
Industry, 21 Yale J Reg 317, 344 n 145 (2004).  
 68 De Beers Consolidated Mines, 325 US at 225 (Douglas dissenting).  
 69 Id (Douglas dissenting).  
 70 463 US 277 (1983). 
 1024  The University of Chicago Law Review [80:1007 
   
parole after committing a series of nonviolent crimes.71 Chief 
Justice Burger dissented, joined by Justices White, Rehnquist, 
and O’Connor, arguing that, in reaching its decision, the Court 
had given itself the power to review sentences for excessive-
ness—something that, at that point,72 Congress had not intend-
ed.73 As Chief Justice Burger wrote, Congress had pondered for 
decades the concept of appellate review of sentences and had 
hesitated to act,74 meaning that the Court’s own decision consti-
tuted “judicial usurpation with a vengeance.”75 
The dissent’s floodgates reasoning echoed that of the dissent 
in De Beers in some ways but differed in others. The Chief Jus-
tice wrote that the “real risk” of the decision was that it would 
result in a “flood” of new cases, all requiring difficult decisions 
by the courts.76 This buttressed his conclusion that Congress 
could not have intended such a result,77 just as Justice Douglas’s 
floodgates argument had done in De Beers.78 But in Solem the 
floodgates argument also took on a weight of its own. The invo-
cation of a flood was used not simply to show that the Court had 
made an error but also to convey the cost of that error. The 
Court had contravened congressional intent, and its doing so 
would impact a significant number of cases.79 
 
 71 Id at 303. 
 72 Just one year after Solem was decided, Congress passed the Sentencing Reform 
Act of 1984, which provided for appellate review. See Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, 
Pub L No 98-473, 98 Stat 1987, codified as amended at 18 USC § 3551 et seq and 28 USC 
§ 991 et seq. See also Kate Stith and José A. Cabranes, Fear of Judging: Sentencing 
Guidelines in the Federal Courts 2 (Chicago 1998) (describing one of the “hallmarks” of 
the Sentencing Reform Act as providing “for the first time . . . for appellate review of 
sentences”).  
 73 Solem, 463 US at 314–15 (Burger dissenting).  
 74 Id at 315 (Burger dissenting). 
 75 Id (Burger dissenting). 
 76 Id (Burger dissenting). See also Rachel E. Barkow, The Court of Life and Death: 
The Two Tracks of Constitutional Sentencing Law and the Case for Uniformity, 107 Mich 
L Rev 1145, 1182–86 (2009) (describing the administrative concerns attendant with the 
Court’s proportionality jurisprudence).  
 77 Solem, 463 US at 314–15 (Burger dissenting). 
 78 See De Beers Consolidated Mines, 325 US at 225 (Douglas dissenting) (“Certainly 
Congress knew that some interlocutory orders might be erroneous when it chose to make 
them non-reviewable.”). See also notes 67–69 and accompanying text.  
 79 Solem, 463 US at 314–15 (Burger dissenting). This latter point suggests that the 
Chief Justice was also motivated by the kind of court-centered floodgates concerns de-
scribed in Part III. Indeed, this is a good example of the fact that the categories de-
scribed here are not mutually exclusive; some floodgates arguments encompass more 
than one type of concern (regarding more than one governmental institution).  
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As in Bivens and Jones,80 the Solem majority responded to 
the floodgates argument by refuting the suggestion that it had 
done anything to open the floodgates. Writing for the majority, 
Justice Powell argued that “[c]ontrary to the dissent’s sugges-
tions, we do not adopt or imply approval of a general rule of ap-
pellate review of sentences.”81 A few lines farther down in the 
opinion, he went out of his way to show that the Court had not 
overextended itself vis-à-vis Congress, writing, “In view of the 
substantial deference that must be accorded legislatures and sen-
tencing courts, a reviewing court rarely will be required to en-
gage in extended analysis to determine that a sentence is not 
constitutionally disproportionate.”82 By arguing that its decision 
was narrow, the majority was attempting to minimize the extent 
to which it was contravening (or appearing to contravene83) leg-
islative intent. And although the Court did not specifically refer 
to floodgates, it implied that its limited holding would not invite 
a slew of new claims. 
Since the dissents in De Beers and Solem first employed 
them, floodgates arguments in the judicial-legislative context 
have taken on increased prominence. In the cases that follow, 
the prime discussion of floodgates appears in majority opinions, 
with the Court offering assurances that its decision will not re-
sult in new litigation. Put another way, these cases show the 
Court offering assurances on its own that it is not disregarding 
congressional intent. 
In Bowen v Michigan Academy of Family Physicians,84 for 
example, a unanimous85 Court held that the Medicare Act86 did 
not bar judicial review of regulations promulgated under Part B 
 
 80 See Bivens, 403 US at 391 n 4 (rejecting the dissent’s concern that an “ava-
lanche” of new cases would follow); Jones, 520 US at 702 (“[I]t seems unlikely that a del-
uge of such litigation will ever engulf the Presidency.”). 
 81 Solem, 463 US at 290 n 16 (citation omitted).  
 82 Id (emphasis added).  
 83 Consider Neil S. Siegel, The Virtue of Judicial Statesmanship, 86 Tex L Rev 959, 
1012 (2008) (assessing the significance of the appearance of various constitutional 
decisions). 
 84 476 US 667 (1986).  
 85 Id at 668.  
 86 Through the Medicare Act, Congress created a scheme for the judicial review of 
certain Medicare claims and not others, such as those under general federal question 
jurisdiction. See Social Security Amendments of 1965 § 102(a), Pub L No 89-97, 79 Stat 
286, 330, 331, codified as amended at 42 USC §§ 1395ff(B)(1), 1395ii; 42 USC § 405(g). 
See also Jonathan R. Siegel, The Polymorphic Principle and the Judicial Role in Statuto-
ry Interpretation, 84 Tex L Rev 339, 356–57 (2005) (describing Michigan Academy of 
Family Physicians and the Medicare Act more generally).  
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of the Medicare program,87 going out of its way to note that “[w]e 
do not believe that our decision will open the floodgates to mil-
lions of Part B Medicare claims.”88 The basis for this statement 
was the Court’s own experience: “We observed no flood of litiga-
tion in the first 20 years of operation of Part B of the Medicare 
program, and we seriously doubt that we will be inundated in 
the future.”89 But the significance of the statement was that it 
provided assurance that the Court was not contravening the in-
tention of Congress in passing the Medicare Act. 
The Court has continued to consider these concerns—most 
recently in the 2011 case Skinner v Switzer.90 In Skinner, a con-
victed state prisoner sought access to crime-scene evidence for 
the purposes of DNA testing.91 The question presented was 
whether he could raise the claim in federal court in a civil rights 
action under 42 USC § 1983, as opposed to the recognized route 
of filing a petition for habeas corpus under 28 USC § 2254.92 The 
respondent argued that recognizing a claim of this kind under 
§ 1983 would result in a “vast expansion” of federal jurisdic-
tion.93 The majority found these fears to be “unwarranted.”94 As 
part of its reasoning, the Court noted that “[i]n the Circuits that 
currently allow § 1983 claims for DNA testing . . . no evidence 
tendered by Switzer shows any litigation flood or even rain-
fall.”95 The Court went on to give additional reasons why its 
holding would not result in a flood, including that Congress had 
 
 87 Michigan Academy of Family Physicians, 476 US at 669.  
 88 Id at 680–81 n 11. 
 89 Id. The Court went on to say that “as one commentator pointed out, ‘permitting 
review only [of] . . . a particular statutory or administrative standard . . . would not re-
sult in a costly flood of litigation, because the validity of a standard can be readily estab-
lished, at times even in a single case.’” Id (alterations in original), quoting Note, Con-
gressional Preclusion of Judicial Review of Federal Benefit Disbursement: Reasserting 
Separation of Powers, 97 Harv L Rev 778, 792 (1984). 
 90 131 S Ct 1289 (2011). 
 91 Id at 1293. 
 92 Id. See also Samuel R. Wiseman, Habeas after Pinholster, 53 BC L Rev 953, 
1004–05 (2012). 
 93 Skinner, 131 S Ct at 1299. 
 94 Id.  
 95 Id. Justice Ginsburg relied on this same language in Connick v Thompson, 131 S 
Ct 1350 (2011), from the same term. Id at 1382–83 n 17 (Ginsburg dissenting) (“The de-
liberate indifference jury instruction in this case was based on the Second Circuit’s opin-
ion in Walker v. New York . . . . There has been no ‘litigation flood or even rainfall,’ Skin-
ner v. Switzer, in that Circuit in Walker’s wake.”) (citations omitted), citing Walker v 
New York, 974 F2d 293, 297–98 (2d Cir 1992), and quoting Skinner, 131 S Ct at 1299. 
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specifically designed the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 199596 
(PLRA) to help control the influx of prisoner suits into the feder-
al courts.97 In short, the majority tried to make plain that its de-
cision would not result in a deluge of new claims and ultimately 
that it was not unduly expanding its own authority vis-à-vis 
Congress.98 
These cases and others99 demonstrate the Court’s use of 
floodgates arguments to bolster its determinations about sub-
stantive law. And as with the executive-centered cases described 
in Part I.A, the Court does so in the interests of a coordinate 
branch of government—here, the legislature. But important dif-
ferences exist between the cases arising in the context of judicial-
executive interactions and those arising in judicial-legislative 
ones. The former are primarily concerned with the direct effects 
of a flood on executive actors and the encumbrances the flood 
would create. In the latter cases, the Court does not fear that an 
influx of filings would place a burden on the legislative branch. 
Rather, the concern in these cases is that a possible deluge of 
new claims would demonstrate that the Court had disregarded 
congressional intent or even that the Court had usurped the leg-
islative function altogether. 
 
 96 Omnibus Consolidated Recessions and Appropriations Act of 1996, Title VIII 
§§ 801–10, Pub L No 104-134, 110 Stat 1321, 1321-066 to -077, codified in relevant part, 
as amended, at 18 USC § 3626.  
 97 See Skinner, 131 S Ct at 1299. 
 98 For a similar sentiment, see Smith v Wade, 461 US 30, 91 (1983) (Rehnquist dis-
senting) (“In a time when the courts are flooded with suits that do not raise colorable 
claims . . . it is regrettable that the Court should take upon itself, in apparent disregard 
for the likely intent of the 42d Congress, the legislative task of encouraging yet more 
litigation.”).  
 99 In a slightly separate vein, the Court has decided cases in which it has referred 
to Congress’s attempts to address a flood of cases through legislation. See, for example, 
Jones v Bock, 549 US 199, 203 (2007): 
Our legal system [ ] remains committed to guaranteeing that prisoner claims of 
illegal conduct by their custodians are fairly handled according to law. The 
challenge lies in ensuring that the flood of nonmeritorious claims does not 
submerge and effectively preclude consideration of the allegations with merit. 
Congress addressed that challenge in the PLRA. 
(citation omitted); Woodford v Ngo, 548 US 81, 91–92 n 2 (2006): 
As for the suggestion that the PLRA might be meant to require proper exhaus-
tion of nonconstitutional claims but not constitutional claims, we fail to see 
how such a carve-out would serve Congress’ purpose of addressing a flood of 
prisoner litigation in the federal courts when the overwhelming majority of 
prisoner civil rights and prison condition suits are based on the Constitution. 
(citation omitted). 
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As in the judicial-executive context, none of the decisions 
here rest exclusively or unambiguously on floodgates arguments. 
Such arguments are more often employed as accusations by dis-
senters than they are embraced by majorities. But the evolution 
from De Beers through cases such as Skinner shows a Court that 
increasingly believes such arguments must at the very least be 
answered, and thus have relevance in substantive decision 
making.  
II.  INTERSYSTEMIC CONCERNS 
The previous Part demonstrated that the justices have used 
floodgates arguments to orient the Court with respect to coordi-
nate branches of government, ensuring that it does not unduly 
burden the executive or disregard congressional intent. This 
Part discusses how the Court has also considered floodgates ar-
guments in the context of its relationship to state courts. Specif-
ically, justices have raised or responded to two types of such 
floodgates concerns: first, about flooding the federal courts with 
claims that belong in state courts, and second, flooding the state 
courts with claims or obligations that would significantly burden 
them. 
Both sets of concerns can be understood as part of a larger 
intersystemic concern about the balance between federal and 
state courts.100 As these cases demonstrate, the justices have 
been concerned with how a high volume of litigation and at-
tendant obligations can affect or even upset that balance. 
A. Taking Too Many Cases That Belong in State Courts 
The justices have considered in some cases whether a par-
ticular decision will lead to a flood of new claims into federal 
court—claims that would otherwise fall to state courts. Many is-
sues are bound up in these cases, but a consistent theme is that 
some justices do not want to upset the balance between the two 
court systems by, in effect, taking too many cases that they be-
lieve belong in state court. 
A prime example of this phenomenon can be found in United 
States v Maze,101 a 1974 case involving the federal mail fraud 
 
 100 See Gluck, 120 Yale L J at 1906 (cited in note 22) (using the term “intersystemic” 
to describe the relationship between the federal and state court systems).  
 101 414 US 395 (1974). 
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statute.102 A majority of the Court concluded that the defendant’s 
actions—which included stealing a credit card but not directly 
using the mails103—fell outside the definition of the statute.104 
Chief Justice Burger dissented, suggesting that the majority’s 
decision was influenced by its “seeming desire not to flood the 
federal courts with a multitude of prosecutions for relatively mi-
nor acts of credit card misrepresentation considered as more ap-
propriately the business of the States.”105 In other words, the 
majority had, assuming Chief Justice Burger’s account, inter-
preted federal law narrowly so as to keep its own dockets from 
being inflated and to not encroach upon “the business of the 
States.” Although this is in part a concern about overcrowding 
the federal courts, it is also undoubtedly one about maintaining 
the “appropriate[ ]” balance of federal-state power.106 
A more recent example can be seen in Justice Ginsburg’s 
dissent in Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, PA v Allstate In-
surance Co.107 The question in Shady Grove was whether the pe-
titioners’ suit could proceed as a class action—a question that 
turned on whether New York’s law prohibiting a class action 
seeking penalties or statutory minimum damages conflicted 
with Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.108 A majori-
ty of the Court held that the New York law conflicted with Rule 
23 and that Rule 23 must govern.109 Justice Ginsburg, joined by 
Justices Kennedy, Breyer, and Alito, dissented, arguing that the 
rules could be reconciled but also that the decision would create 
intersystemic problems.110 Specifically, the dissent predicted 
that, as a result of the decision, federal courts would become a 
“mecca” for “class actions seeking state-created penalties for 
claims arising under state law—claims that would be barred 
from class treatment in the State’s own courts.”111 Justice 
 
 102 Id at 396, citing 18 USC § 1341. 
 103 Specifically, Thomas Maze had stolen his roommate’s credit card and used it in 
multiple states at various purveyors, who ultimately mailed receipts to the bank at-
tached to the credit card. See Maze, 414 US at 396.  
 104 See id at 404–05. 
 105 See id at 407 (Burger dissenting).  
 106 Id (Burger dissenting).  
 107 130 S Ct 1431 (2010). 
 108 See id at 1436, citing FRCP 23.  
 109 See Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, 130 S Ct at 1448. 
 110 See id at 1460 (Ginsburg dissenting).  
 111 Id at 1473 (Ginsburg dissenting). There was also a legislative intent element to 
this argument—Justice Ginsburg noted that surely Congress did not mean to cause this 
outcome when creating the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005. Pub L No 109-2, 119 Stat 
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Ginsburg then argued that her own proposed approach would 
not result in an improper shuffling of cases from state to federal 
court: “There is no risk that individual plaintiffs seeking statu-
tory penalties will flood federal courts with state-law claims that 
could be managed more efficiently on a class basis; the diversity 
statute’s amount-in-controversy requirement ensures that small 
state-law disputes remain in state court.”112 
Shady Grove raises a multitude of questions about inter-
preting state law and Federal Rules,113 about the nature of the 
Rules Enabling Act,114 and about federalism generally.115 But in 
the midst of this considerable decision, the Justices also took 
care to address the balance of cases between the state and fed-
eral courts. In particular, Justice Ginsburg went out of her way 
to note that, under her view of how the case should be decided, 
the federal courts would not be “flood[ed]”116 with cases that tru-
ly belonged in state court, emphasizing the view that an on-
slaught of such cases coming into federal court would be 
problematic. 
But perhaps the best example of the Court being concerned 
with intersystemic issues can be seen in the 2005 case Grable & 
Sons Metal Products, Inc v Darue Engineering & Manufactur-
ing.117 In Grable, the Court again tried to define the boundaries 
of the federal question jurisdiction (its earlier attempt in Merrell 
Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc v Thompson118 having left something 
to be desired119). The specific question at hand was whether a 
state-law quiet-title action against a federal tax sale purchaser 
 
4, codified in various sections of Title 28. See Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, 130 S 
Ct at 1473 (Ginsburg dissenting). 
 112 Id at 1472–73 n 14 (Ginsburg dissenting). 
 113 See Kermit Roosevelt III, Choice of Law in Federal Courts: From Erie and Klax-
on to CAFA and Shady Grove, 106 Nw U L Rev 1, 50–53 (2012).  
 114 Pub L No 73-415, ch 651, 48 Stat 1064 (1934), codified as amended at 28 USC 
§ 2072. See also Stephen B. Burbank and Tobias Barrington Wolff, Redeeming the 
Missed Opportunities of Shady Grove, 159 U Pa L Rev 17, 25–53 (2010). 
 115 See Adam N. Steinman, Our Class Action Federalism: Erie and the Rules Ena-
bling Act After Shady Grove, 86 Notre Dame L Rev 1131, 1137–43 (2011). 
 116 Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, 130 S Ct at 1472–73 n 14 (Ginsburg 
dissenting). 
 117 545 US 308 (2005). 
 118 478 US 804 (1986).  
 119 Justice Brennan, joined by Justices White, Marshall, and Blackmun, dissented 
from the majority’s holding in Merrell Dow, arguing that the Court’s new test for federal 
question jurisdiction was “infinitely malleable.” Id at 821–23 n 1 (Brennan dissenting). 
Court scholars were even stronger in their criticism. See, for example, Martin Redish, 
Federal Jurisdiction: Tensions in the Allocation of Judicial Power 99–102 (Michie 2d ed 
1990). 
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could be removed from state to federal court, in light of the fact 
that an essential element of the claim was that the previous 
owner had not received adequate notice of the sale from the In-
ternal Revenue Service.120 A unanimous Court concluded that 
the case could be brought in federal court, and noted that ex-
panding federal question jurisdiction in this way “would not dis-
tort any division of labor between the state and federal 
courts.”121 Indeed, the Court’s holding was clearly influenced by 
the fact that its decision would not greatly upset the state-court 
balance. As Justice Souter wrote for the majority: 
Because arising-under jurisdiction to hear a state-law claim 
always raises the possibility of upsetting the state-federal 
line drawn (or at least assumed) by Congress, the presence 
of a disputed federal issue and the ostensible importance of 
a federal forum are never necessarily dispositive; there 
must always be an assessment of any disruptive portent in 
exercising federal jurisdiction.122 
The Court then determined that allowing the particular case at 
hand would not be problematic, because it would not result in a 
flood of cases: “[B]ecause it will be the rare state title case that 
raises a contested matter of federal law, federal jurisdiction to 
resolve genuine disagreement over federal tax title provisions 
will portend only a microscopic effect on the federal-state divi-
sion of labor.”123 (This finding was in marked contrast to what 
would have happened, the Court said, if it had allowed in the 
kind of claim at issue in Merrell Dow—a “tremendous number of 
cases” would have come from state to federal court.124) Returning 
to the floodgates theme once more, the Court concluded, “juris-
diction over actions like Grable’s would not materially affect, or 
threaten to affect, the normal currents of litigation.”125 
In both Maze and Shady Grove, one can see members of the 
Court considering the effects of diverting cases into federal 
courts that, to their minds, are truly the business of state 
 
 120 Grable & Sons Metal Products, 545 US at 310–11.  
 121 Id at 310.  
 122 Id at 314. It is worth noting that in addition to being concerned about the divi-
sion of labor between the federal and state court systems, the Court was also concerned 
about being faithful to Congress’s view of where this division should lie. As noted earlier, 
the categories of floodgates cases are not meant to be exclusive of each other—some cases 
will of course raise multiple kinds of floodgates concerns. See note 79. 
 123 Grable & Sons Metal Products, 545 US at 315.  
 124 Id at 318. 
 125 Id at 319. 
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courts.126 In Grable, the entirety of the Court is concerned with 
the division of labor between the state and federal courts, and 
how that division is affected ultimately dictates the outcome of 
the case. Most importantly, in all of these cases, the expressed 
concern of the justices is not simply one about how an increased 
caseload would affect the federal judiciary, but about the bal-
ance between the federal and state courts more broadly. 
B. Creating Too Many Cases or Obligations for State Courts 
Beyond worrying about shifting cases from state to federal 
court, the justices have also worried about the inverse prob-
lem:127 creating too many cases—and obligations more general-
ly—for state courts.128 Examples of this concern can be found in 
the line of cases on the termination of parental rights—obliquely 
in the 1981 case of Lassiter v Department of Social Services of 
Durham County, North Carolina129 and then overtly in the 1996 
case of M.L.B. v S.L.J.130 
 
 126 Although not expressed in terms of floodgates, another recent example of this 
general sentiment can be found in Justice Breyer’s concurrence in Stop the Beach Re-
nourishment, Inc v Florida Department of Environmental Protection, 130 S Ct 2592 
(2010). As Justice Breyer argued,  
[T]he approach the plurality would take today threatens to open the feder-
al court doors to constitutional review of many, perhaps large numbers of, 
state-law cases in an area of law familiar to state, but not federal, judges. And 
the failure of that approach to set forth procedural limitations or canons of def-
erence would create the distinct possibility that federal judges would play a 
major role in the shaping of a matter of significant state interest—state prop-
erty law. 
Id at 2619 (Breyer concurring). 
 127 The claim is that this category is the inverse of the previous one insofar as the 
previous category included concerns about taking too many cases from state courts while 
this category includes concerns about imposing too many cases or obligations on state 
courts. I recognize that the two are not perfectly opposite from the standpoint of the fed-
eral courts, though. In the previous category, the federal courts were taking cases that 
would otherwise go to the state courts; in this category, the federal courts’ caseload is not 
necessarily impacted.  
 128 In a related vein, the Court has considered concerns that a particular holding 
would lead to a flood of cases that would create mutually exclusive obligations for the 
states. See Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v Smith, 
494 US 872, 916 (1990) (Blackmun dissenting): 
The State fears that, if it grants an exemption for religious peyote use, a flood 
of other claims to religious exemptions will follow. It would then be placed in a 
dilemma, it says, between allowing a patchwork of exemptions that would hin-
der its law enforcement efforts, and risking a violation of the Establishment 
Clause by arbitrarily limiting its religious exemptions. 
 129 452 US 18 (1981). 
 130 519 US 102 (1996). 
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In Lassiter, the Court confronted the question of whether 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires 
the appointment of counsel for indigent parents in all parental 
status–termination proceedings.131 A majority of the Court de-
cided against recognizing a categorical right, and instead adopt-
ed a case-by-case approach.132 Although the Court’s opinion did 
not state that finding the right to counsel in all parental status–
termination cases would lead to an increase in caseload, the dis-
senting Justices argued that this fear motivated the Court’s de-
cision making. Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Brennan 
and Marshall, wrote that requiring appointment of counsel in 
these cases “will not open the ‘floodgates’ that, I suspect, the 
Court fears.”133 The dissent continued: “On the contrary, we can-
not constitutionally afford the closure that the result in this sad 
case imposes upon us all.”134 While the dissenting Justices’ lan-
guage is not entirely precise, it suggests that they thought the 
majority was improperly motivated by a fear of additional due 
process cases coming into court135—both federal and state136—as 
well as imposing a burden on the states by requiring them to 
supply counsel in more cases.137 
In M.L.B., several of the Justices raised similar intersys-
temic concerns about the burdens that the Court would be im-
posing upon the states, this time more directly. In M.L.B. a 
 
 131 Lassiter, 452 US at 24. 
 132 See id at 32–33.  
 133 Id at 58–59 (Blackmun dissenting).  
 134 Id at 59 (Blackmun dissenting). Notably, the dissent began by arguing that a 
contrary decision would not open the floodgates, but then concluded with a different sen-
timent: that the price of closing the gates would be too costly. Yet the precise cost the 
Justices were concerned with is unclear; it is ambiguous whether they were taking the 
position that the Court should not consider a potential increase in litigation in this realm 
full stop or whether the particular issues raised in this case justified the number of cases 
that might flow from it.  
 135 See Stephen Loffredo and Don Friedman, Gideon Meets Goldberg: The Case for a 
Qualified Right to Counsel in Welfare Hearings, 25 Touro L Rev 273, 311 (2009): 
Lassiter is most intelligible through the lens of underenforcement . . . as a pru-
dential determination to cabin the so-called “due process revolution”—and calm 
the institutional, federalism, and separation-of-powers concerns it carried in its 
wake—by drawing a doctrinally arbitrary line to close the “floodgates” the 
Court apparently feared. 
 136 Lassiter itself had come from the North Carolina Court of Appeals. Lassiter, 452 
US at 24. 
 137 See Note, Access to Justice—Civil Right to Counsel—California Establishes Pilot 
Programs to Expand Access to Counsel for Low-Income Parties—Act of Oct. 11, 2009, ch. 
457 (Codified in Scattered Sections of Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code and Cal. Gov’t Code), 123 
Harv L Rev 1532, 1536 (2010).  
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mother appealed a decree terminating her parental rights, but 
her appeal was dismissed because she could not afford the fee to 
prepare the record below as Mississippi law required.138 The ma-
jority held that it was unconstitutional for Mississippi to condi-
tion the right to appeal on ability to pay, invoking both due pro-
cess and equal protection.139 Justice Thomas, joined by Justice 
Scalia and in part by Chief Justice Rehnquist, dissented, argu-
ing that by creating a constitutional right to a free transcript in 
a civil case (as opposed to in criminal cases, where the right had 
already been established),140 the Court was inviting a flood of 
new cases.141 As Justice Thomas wrote, “The inevitable conse-
quence will be greater demands on the States to provide free as-
sistance to would-be appellants in all manner of civil cases in-
volving interests that cannot, based on the test established by 
the majority, be distinguished from the admittedly important in-
terest at issue here.”142 The Justice went on to emphasize just 
what a burden the decision would create for state courts, citing 
the tens of thousands of civil actions that Mississippi faced each 
year.143 
The majority addressed these arguments directly, noting 
that “[r]espondents and the dissenters urge that we will open 
floodgates” if the right were extended to include free tran-
scripts in noncriminal cases.144 The Court’s response was that 
parental-termination cases were sufficiently sui generis so as to avoid 
 
 138 M.L.B., 519 US at 106. 
 139 See id at 107. See also Judith Resnik, Money Matters: Judicial Market Interven-
tions Creating Subsidies and Awarding Fees and Costs in Individual and Aggregate Liti-
gation, 148 U Pa L Rev 2119, 2135 (2000) (describing how requiring a subsidy for this 
“and then only for this” class of litigant “required the Court to thread a complex path in 
light of contemporary equal protection and due process law”). 
 140 See Mayer v City of Chicago, 404 US 189, 193–94 (1971) (holding that the Equal 
Protection Clause requires providing an indigent criminal defendant appealing his con-
viction with an adequate record even in cases involving a minor offense); Griffin v Illi-
nois, 351 US 12, 19 (1956) (plurality) (holding that a state must provide an indigent 
criminal defendant appealing his conviction with a trial transcript or its equivalent). 
 141 M.L.B., 519 US at 129–30 (Thomas dissenting).  
 142 Id at 130 (Thomas dissenting). 
 143 Id at 143 n 8 (Thomas dissenting). Specifically, Justice Thomas argued that 
“Mississippi will no doubt find little solace in the fact that, as the majority notes, of 
63,765 civil actions filed in Mississippi Chancery Court in 1995, 194 were parental ter-
mination cases . . . [since] ‘39,475 were domestic relations cases,’ ‘1027 involved custody 
or visitation, and 6080 were paternity cases.’” Id, quoting Brief for Respondents, M.L.B. 
v S.L.J., No 95-853, *28 (filed June 28, 1996) (available on Westlaw at 1996 WL 365897).  
 144 M.L.B., 519 US at 127 (majority). 
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creating a flood.145 Because the majority saw parental-termination 
cases as a distinct set, it was not concerned that a flood of re-
quests would come to state court for free transcripts or that the 
states would now be obligated to pay for free transcripts in other 
kinds of cases. It simply did not forecast a flood of any kind. 
Together, Lassiter and M.L.B. show the justices to be con-
cerned about the effects their decisions will have on the volume 
of litigation—litigation that will largely end up in state 
court146—and the creation of related obligations, such as free 
transcripts.147 As in the interbranch context, the immediate con-
cern is not over flooding the federal courts with additional cases. 
Rather, these cases, along with Maze, Shady Grove, and Grable, 
show the Court considering floodgates arguments while engag-
ing more generally with the question of how their decisions will 
affect the balance between the federal and state court systems. 
III.  COURT-CENTERED CONCERNS  
The floodgates arguments discussed thus far can be cast as 
primarily outward looking; that is, the Supreme Court has con-
sidered what a deluge of claims would mean for another 
 
 145 Id 127–28. As the majority wrote, “[W]e have repeatedly noticed what sets paren-
tal status termination decrees apart from mine run civil actions, even from other domes-
tic relations matters such as divorce, paternity, and child custody. To recapitulate, ter-
mination decrees ‘wor[k] a unique kind of deprivation.’” Id (second alteration in original 
and citation omitted), quoting Lassiter, 452 US at 27. 
 146 For another example of a concern over increasing filings in the state courts, see 
Apprendi v New Jersey, 530 US 466, 550–51 (2000) (O’Connor dissenting): 
[P]erhaps the most significant impact of the Court’s decision will be a practical 
one—its unsettling effect on sentencing conducted under current federal and 
state determinate-sentencing schemes. . . . Thus, with respect to past sentences 
handed down by judges under determinate-sentencing schemes, the Court’s de-
cision threatens to unleash a flood of petitions by convicted defendants seeking 
to invalidate their sentences in whole or in part on the authority of the Court’s 
decision today. Statistics compiled by the United States Sentencing Commis-
sion reveal that almost a half-million cases have been sentenced under the 
Sentencing Guidelines since 1989. Federal cases constitute only the tip of the 
iceberg. . . . Because many States, like New Jersey, have determinate-
sentencing schemes, the number of individual sentences drawn into question 
by the Court’s decision could be colossal.  
 147 It is worth noting that parts of the floodgates arguments in Lassiter and M.L.B. 
have a slippery slope quality to them—that is, if the Court recognizes the right to coun-
sel or a free transcript in this case, it will necessarily have to do so in the next set of cas-
es down the line. See note 13. That said, because the justices are also clearly concerned 
with the number of cases and attendant obligations that the state courts will be forced to 
handle as a result of their decisions, these cases can be understood as traditional flood-
gates cases as well.  
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institution, or its dynamic with that institution—be it the execu-
tive branch, the legislative branch, or state courts. But there is a 
final set of floodgates arguments that are inward looking, 
through which the justices consider guarding the floodgates to 
protect the federal judiciary itself. 
At the most basic level, the Court in these cases considers 
the possibility of a flood because it is concerned that a slew of 
additional cases would lead to an increased workload for the 
federal courts. But not all floods are alike, and the Court has re-
acted to them based not only on their size, but also on the types 
of claims they are likely to contain. Specifically, the justices 
sometimes argue that a particular decision would be problematic 
because it would unleash a large number of frivolous cases, 
making it more difficult to give time to, and even to discern, the 
meritorious claims the courts must review. In other cases, the 
justices make no mention of potential frivolity, focusing instead 
on the sheer number of cases that could come into federal court. 
Context is crucial for deciphering the Court’s arguments, 
and timing is part of that context. Between 1950 and 1978, the 
annual filings per active judgeship in the federal courts of ap-
peals nearly doubled—from 73 to 137.148 Although figures for the 
district judges improved as their ranks more than doubled dur-
ing this period, they still faced an average of 343 filings per year 
at the end of that time.149 As a result, judges and scholars began 
to refer to the “crisis in volume” that the federal judiciary 
faced.150 Since that time, the caseloads have only continued to 
expand.151 It is thus unsurprising that, particularly beginning in 
 
 148 See Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals, 
Final Report 14 (Dec 18, 1998), online at http://www.library.unt.edu/gpo/csafca/final 
/appstruc.pdf (visited Sept 10, 2013). 
 149 Id. 
 150 See Huang, 124 Harv L Rev at 1112 (cited in note 9). See also Levy, 61 Duke L J 
at 321 n 21 (cited in note 35).  
 151 As of the 12-month period ending March 31, 2013, the average number of filings 
per active judgeship in the federal courts of appeals was 338 (which is the number of fil-
ings excluding the Federal Circuit—56,453—divided by the number of active judgeships 
excluding the Federal Circuit—167). See U.S. Court of Appeals—Judicial Caseload Pro-
file *1 (Administrative Office of the US Courts Mar, 2013), online at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/viewer.aspx?doc=/uscourts/Statistics/FederalCourtManagement
Statistics/2013/appeals-fcms-profiles-march-2013.pdf&page=1 (visited Sept 10, 2013). 
 The annual filing per active judge in the federal district courts during the same time 
period was 560. See United States District Courts—National Judicial Caseload Profile *1 
(Administrative Office of the US Courts Mar, 2013) online at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/viewer.aspx?doc=/uscourts/Statistics/FederalCourtManagement
Statistics/2013/district-fcms-profiles-march-2013.pdf&page=1 (visited Sept 10, 2013). 
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the 1970s, justices began to raise floodgates concerns on their 
own152 and their colleagues’ behalf.  
This Part explores the various court-centered floodgates ar-
guments that the Court has confronted, beginning with those fo-
cused on frivolous claims before turning to those based on claims 
more generally. Though the particulars vary, the theme remains 
the same: the Court has consistently considered the possibility 
that a particular decision will result in a flood of new claims into 
the federal courts, and has even taken that possibility into ac-
count in its substantive analysis. 
A. Burdening the Courts with Frivolous Claims 
The justices have often expressed the concern that a given 
holding will unleash a flood of new claims—particularly frivo-
lous claims.153 As one might expect, this kind of court-centered 
argument appears with a relatively high frequency in lines of 
cases that have consistently been perceived as containing a high 
percentage of unmeritorious claims: Bivens,154 habeas,155 and 
 
 152 It is worth remembering that before Congress enacted legislation in 1988 to make 
the Court’s jurisdiction almost entirely discretionary, the Court’s own docket was viewed 
as “unmanageable.” See Kathryn A. Watts, Constraining Certiorari Using Administra-
tive Law Principles, 160 U Penn L Rev 1, 13 (2011). Indeed, in 1972, Chief Justice Burg-
er created a commission, known as the Freund Study Group, specifically to examine the 
demanding workload of the Supreme Court and ways to reduce the burden on the Court. 
See Judith A. McKenna, Structural and Other Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Ap-
peals: Report to the United States Congress and the Judicial Conference of the United 
States 76 (1993).  
 153 Although the Court discusses floodgates in the context of frivolous cases and in 
the context of claims more generally, just which concern is animating the argument in a 
given opinion is not always clear. As with the rest of the discussion, I rely primarily on 
the text of the opinions themselves to determine the particular concern. But as with the 
preceding categories, the categories surveyed in this Part are not impermeable.  
 154 See, for example, James E. Pfander, Iqbal, Bivens, and the Role of Judge-Made 
Law in Constitutional Litigation, 114 Penn St L Rev 1387, 1407 (2010) (noting the “wide-
ly held view that frivolous Bivens claims . . . have multiplied over the past generation to 
a degree that threatens to overwhelm the federal judiciary”). See also Alexander A. 
Reinert, Measuring the Success of Bivens Litigation and Its Consequences for the Indi-
vidual Liability Model, 62 Stan L Rev 809, 846 (2010) (noting that there are “those in the 
judiciary who see Bivens claims as almost universally frivolous” but also providing data 
that indicates that Bivens claims have enjoyed “greater success than has been assumed 
to date”). 
 155 Judges and justices have consistently viewed habeas filings as being filled with a 
high percentage of frivolous cases. Justice Jackson wrote in Brown v Allen, 344 US 443 
(1953), that “[i]t must prejudice the occasional meritorious application [for habeas cor-
pus] to be buried in a flood of worthless ones.” Id at 537 (Jackson concurring). Nearly 
twenty years later, Judge Henry Friendly commented on Justice Jackson’s sentiment, 
writing, “The thought may be distasteful but no judge can honestly deny it is real.” 
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prisoner cases.156 The discussion here focuses on these lines of 
cases157 not only because they have been prominent sources of 
floodgates arguments, but also because these three areas of sub-
stantive law, in turn, illustrate three different ways in which 
court-centered floodgates concerns can impact legal decision 
making: in a policy-making context, in statutory interpretation, 
and in consideration of constitutional claims. 
1. Bivens cases. 
The Bivens line of cases provides the starkest examples of 
the justices considering floodgates reasoning in their substan-
tive analysis. This makes sense on an intuitive level as Bivens is 
generally understood to allow for “judicial policymaking”158—
thereby giving the justices greater latitude in their own decision 
making. What is surprising, though, is the extent to which the 
Court as a whole has pivoted on whether concerns about work-
load can be taken into account when deciding whether to recog-
nize a private right of action and remedy. Because of this 
marked judicial back-and-forth, and because the justices them-
selves specifically discuss “the ‘floodgates’ argument” in the con-
text of this line of cases,159 Bivens and its progeny merit particu-
lar attention. 
 
Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 
U Chi L Rev 142, 149 (1970). 
 156 The number of frivolous filings from prisoners—particularly pro se—was per-
ceived to be such a problem that Congress passed the PLRA. In the words of the Su-
preme Court, “Beyond doubt, Congress enacted [the exhaustion provision of the PLRA] 
to reduce the quantity and improve the quality of prisoner suits.” Porter v Nussle, 534 
US 516, 524 (2002). Still, Judge Jon Newman of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals 
wrote that the challenge for courts, even after the passage of the PLRA, is “to avoid let-
ting the large number of frivolous complaints and appeals impair their conscientious 
consideration of the few meritorious cases that are filed.” Jon O. Newman, Pro Se Pris-
oner Litigation: Looking for Needles in Haystacks, 62 Brooklyn L Rev 519, 526–27 (1996).  
 157 Floodgates arguments, of course, have existed outside of these three lines of cas-
es. See, for example, Agostini v Felton, 521 US 203, 238 (1997) (“If we were to sanction 
this use of Rule 60(b)(5), respondents argue, we would encourage litigants to burden the 
federal courts with a deluge of Rule 60(b)(5) motions premised on nothing more than the 
claim that various judges or Justices have stated that the law has changed.”); Stack v 
Boyle, 342 US 1, 11–13 (1951) (Jackson concurring) (describing the need for an approach 
to reviewing bail orders that “would not open the floodgates to a multitude of trivial dis-
putes abusive of the motion procedure”). These three lines of cases are simply the most 
prominent among the cases surveyed.  
 158 See George D. Brown, “Counter-Counter-Terrorism via Lawsuit”—The Bivens 
Impasse, 82 S Cal L Rev 841, 883 (2009). 
 159 Wilkie, 551 US at 577 (Ginsburg concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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As noted in Part I.A, the specific floodgates argument raised 
in Bivens was that recognizing the cause of action would result 
in suits that would in turn hamper the ability of executive offi-
cials to perform their jobs. Yet other opinions in the case re-
vealed a deep concern for the welfare of the federal judiciary it-
self. In his dissent, Justice Black wrote that the courts160 by that 
time were “choked with lawsuits” and that even the Supreme 
Court’s own docket had reached “an unprecedented volume.”161 
As a result of the rise in caseload, Justice Black argued that the 
system was not functioning as it should: “Many criminal defend-
ants do not receive speedy trials and neither society nor the ac-
cused are assured of justice when inordinate delays occur. Citi-
zens must wait years to litigate their private civil suits.”162 From 
his perspective, a “growing number” of the cases coming to the 
federal courts were “frivolous,” and given the existing demands 
on the courts, he thought that judges had better things to do 
with their time than wade through such claims.163 
Justice Harlan responded in his concurrence with what 
would become the paradigmatic denouncement of court-centered 
floodgates arguments. While acknowledging the “increasingly 
scarce” resources of the judiciary, he also argued that the courts’ 
strained resources should not preclude recognition of a cause of 
action: 
[W]hen we automatically close the courthouse door solely on 
this basis, we implicitly express a value judgment on the 
comparative importance of classes of legally protected inter-
ests. And current limitations upon the effective functioning 
of the courts arising from budgetary inadequacies should 
not be permitted to stand in the way of the recognition of 
otherwise sound constitutional principles.164 
Members of the Court have repeatedly invoked this rejection of 
workload-related floodgates arguments as the Court has contin-
ued to confront whether to create new private rights of action 
under Bivens. 
 
 160 Justice Black here refers to both the “courts of the United States” and “those of 
the States” when expressing his concerns. Bivens, 403 US at 428 (Black dissenting). 
 161 Id (Black dissenting). Again, it is important to recall that the decision in Bivens 
occurred well before the Supreme Court’s docket became almost entirely discretionary. 
See note 152.  
 162 Bivens, 403 US at 428–29 (Black dissenting). 
 163 Id (Black dissenting). 
 164 Id at 411 (Harlan concurring).  
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Eight years later in Davis v Passman,165 the Court consid-
ered whether an implied cause of action and damages remedy 
could be read into the Fifth Amendment’s right to due process.166 
The court of appeals had declined to recognize a new private 
right of action—a decision based in part on its concern that do-
ing so would “delug[e] federal courts with claims.”167 The Su-
preme Court reversed the decision and went out of its way to 
state that “[w]e do not perceive the potential for such a del-
uge.”168 After rejecting the notion that a flood of claims would 
likely follow its decision, however, the Court rejected the very 
invocation of floodgates reasoning. Writing for the majority, Jus-
tice Brennan stated, “[P]erhaps the most fundamental answer to 
the concerns expressed by the Court of Appeals is that provided 
by Mr. Justice Harlan concurring in Bivens.”169 He then repeated 
Justice Harlan’s statement that the Court should not “automati-
cally close the courthouse door solely” on the basis of how deci-
sions affect judicial resources.170 
Despite the Court’s resounding rejection of the floodgates 
argument in Passman, the Justices apparently found the same 
argument deeply influential in a more recent case—a move con-
sistent with the Court’s seeming desire to limit Bivens claims 
generally.171 In Wilkie, the Court declined to recognize a Bivens 
action for a person who claimed that he was harassed and intim-
idated by officials of the Bureau of Land Management who were 
trying to gain an easement across his private property in viola-
tion of his Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights.172 Writing for 
the majority, Justice Souter engaged in a balancing analysis173 
 
 165 442 US 228 (1979). 
 166 Id at 230. The case arose when Shirley Davis, a former employee of Louisiana 
Congressman Otto Passman, tried to bring a civil suit against Passman for sexual har-
assment. Davis claimed that she had an implied cause of action in the Fifth Amend-
ment’s right to due process. Id at 230–31.  
 167 Davis v Passman, 571 F2d 793, 800 (5th Cir 1978). 
 168 Passman, 442 US at 248. By way of support, the Court noted, inter alia, that a 
damages remedy was already available to redress certain injuries arising under color of 
state law under 42 USC § 1983. Id.  
 169 Id. 
 170 Id. 
 171 See Reinert, 62 Stan L Rev at 824 (cited in note 154) (noting the “Supreme 
Court’s refusal to extend Bivens liability to new constitutional claims or new defendants 
since 1980”). 
 172 Wilkie, 551 US at 541. 
 173 Specifically, the Court said that its task was to “weigh[ ] reasons for and against 
the creation of a new cause of action.” Id at 554. This inquiry is also known as “Bivens 
step two.” Id, citing Bush v Lucas, 462 US 367, 378 (1983). The Court in Wilkie reached 
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and concluded that defining a “workable” cause of action in the 
case at hand was simply too difficult.174 Any kind of general 
standard that the Court could articulate, the majority argued, 
would invite a flood of new claims.175 To be clear, the majority’s 
argument was not that the government’s alleged behavior could 
not support a Bivens claim—indeed, Justice Souter wrote that 
“[t]he point here is not to deny that Government employees 
sometimes overreach, for of course they do, and they may have 
done so here”176—but that any attempt to separate the wheat 
from the chaff would lead to too much work for the courts them-
selves. As the majority concluded, “A judicial standard to identi-
fy illegitimate pressure going beyond legitimately hard bargain-
ing would be endlessly knotty to work out, and . . . would invite 
an onslaught of Bivens actions.”177 It is worth noting that the 
majority went out of its way to claim that its decision was influ-
enced by how difficult it was to create a limiting principle for fu-
ture cases, not by how many cases would follow.178 But this 
statement is inconsistent with the majority’s express concern 
over inviting “an onslaught of Bivens actions”179 and indeed, the 
dissent clearly thought it was the possibility of increased litiga-
tion that was motivating the majority’s decision.180 
In dissent, Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justice Stevens, 
squarely rejected the majority’s reliance on floodgates concerns. 
Alleging that the Court’s primary concern was with the “conse-
quences” of “open[ing] the floodgates to a host of unworthy 
suits,”181 the dissent invoked both Justice Harlan’s concurrence 
in Bivens and the Court’s language in Passman to push back on 
that argument: 
 
this inquiry only after deciding in “Bivens step one” that the “state of the law gives Rob-
bins no intuitively meritorious case for recognizing a new constitutional cause of action, 
but neither does it plainly answer no to the question whether he should have it.” Wilkie, 
551 US at 551, 554. 
 174 Wilkie, 551 US at 555–57. 
 175 Id at 561 (“[A]t this high level of generality, a Bivens action to redress retaliation 
against those who resist Government impositions on their property rights would invite 
claims in every sphere of legitimate governmental action affecting property interests, 
from negotiating tax claim settlements to enforcing Occupational Safety and Health Ad-
ministration regulations.”). 
 176 Id. 
 177 Id at 562.  
 178 Wilkie, 551 US at 561 n 11. 
 179 Id at 562. 
 180 See id at 569 (Ginsburg concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 181 Id (Ginsburg concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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The “floodgates” argument the Court today embraces has 
been rehearsed and rejected before. In Passman, the Court 
of Appeals emphasized, as a reason counseling denial of a 
Bivens remedy, the danger of “deluging federal courts with 
. . . claims.” . . . This Court disagreed, turning to Justice 
Harlan’s concurring opinion in Bivens to explain why. The 
only serious policy argument against recognizing a right of 
action for Bivens, Justice Harlan observed, was the risk of 
inundating courts with Fourth Amendment claims. He 
found the argument unsatisfactory. 
. . . 
In attributing heavy weight to the floodgates concern 
pressed in this case, the Court today veers away from Jus-
tice Harlan’s sound counsel.182 
After this thorough rejection of the floodgates argument, the dis-
sent went on to give reasons why “one could securely forecast 
that the flood the Court fears would not come to pass.”183 The 
dissent then concluded by returning to its original position: 
“[S]hutting the door to all plaintiffs . . . is a measure too 
extreme.”184 
The Bivens line of cases provides an unusually sharp illus-
tration of the Court wrestling with the relevance of workload 
concerns—particularly those involving frivolous cases—to the 
substantive analysis of law. Early on, a majority of the justices 
directly confronted the use of floodgates arguments and decisive-
ly stated that a possible increase in litigation simply was not a 
sufficient—or even appropriate—reason to decide against recog-
nizing a private right of action. More recently, the Court has 
shown itself to be receptive to considering concerns about the 
 
 182 Wilkie, 551 US at 577 (Ginsburg concurring in part and dissenting in part), quot-
ing Passman, 442 US at 248, and citing Bivens, 403 US at 410–11 (Harlan concurring).  
 183 Wilkie, 551 US at 581 (Ginsburg concurring in part and dissenting in part). Spe-
cifically, Justice Ginsburg reasoned that “[i]f numerous Bivens claims would eventuate 
were courts to entertain claims like Robbins’, then courts should already have encoun-
tered endeavors to mount Fifth Amendment Takings Clause suits under § 1983.” Id 
(Ginsburg concurring in part and dissenting in part). She noted, however, that “the 
Court of Appeals, the Solicitor General, and Robbins all agree[d] that there [were] no 
reported cases on charges of retaliation by state officials against the exercise of Taking 
Clause rights.” Id (Ginsburg concurring in part and dissenting in part), citing Robbins v 
Wilkie, 433 F3d 755, 767 (10th Cir 2006), Brief for the Petitioners, Wilkie v Robbins, No 
06-219, *48 (filed Jan 16, 2007) (available on Westlaw at 2007 WL 128587), and Brief for 
the Respondent, Wilkie v Robbins, No 06-219, *31 (filed Feb 20, 2007) (available on 
Westlaw at 2007 WL 550926). 
 184 Wilkie, 551 US at 582 (Ginsburg concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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workload of the federal courts in reaching its decisions. Just 
what is responsible for this about-face is unclear. As scholars 
have noted, the Court has been generally resistant to recogniz-
ing new Bivens claims in the years after Passman was decid-
ed.185 Although there are undoubtedly several moving pieces to 
the Court’s shift in jurisprudence, one piece appears to be the 
concern about workload itself—that is, it is possible that the jus-
tices became willing to include caseload concerns in their analy-
sis precisely because they began to see the caseload as a greater 
problem that needed somehow to be addressed. Whatever the 
cause, this set of cases makes clear that at least some of the jus-
tices recently have been willing to take potential increases in lit-
igation—particularly unmeritorious litigation—into account 
when reaching a decision. 
2. Habeas cases. 
Bivens and its progeny demonstrate the prominence of, and 
even controversy surrounding, floodgates arguments in cases in-
volving judicial policy making. In the habeas context,186 the con-
troversy changes shape as concerns about fidelity to statutory 
text come to the fore. One of the first cases to raise concerns 
about a deluge of new habeas claims, many of which would like-
ly be frivolous, is the 1953 case of Brown v Allen.187 Allen is now 
 
 185 See note 171. Indeed, following the Court’s decision in Wilkie, judges and schol-
ars alike have concluded that the Bivens doctrine has been greatly diminished. See, for 
example, Marsha S. Berzon, Securing Fragile Foundations: Affirmative Constitutional 
Adjudication in Federal Courts, 84 NYU L Rev 681, 699 (2009) (“Bivens today appears to 
be hanging by a thread.”); Laurence H. Tribe, Death by a Thousand Cuts: Constitutional 
Wrongs without Remedies after Wilkie v. Robbins, 2007 Cato S Ct Rev 23, 26 (“[T]he best 
that can be said of the Bivens doctrine is that it is on life support with little prospect of 
recovery.”). This view was reinforced during October Term 2011, when the Court de-
clined to find a Bivens action against federal contractors in Minneci v Pollard, 132 S Ct 
617, 623 (2012). For a thoughtful analysis of the Court’s current Bivens jurisprudence, 
see generally Carlos M. Vázquez and Stephen I. Vladeck, State Law, the Westfall Act, 
and the Nature of the Bivens Question, 161 U Pa L Rev 509 (2013).  
 186 Decisions that lead to an increase in habeas petitions of course also have some 
impact on state courts. That said, the floodgates arguments raised in this set of cases 
speak to concerns about flooding the federal courts, not the state courts, with claims. As 
such, they are included only in this category.  
 Similarly, floodgates concerns in the context of habeas often tie in a concern about 
Congress—specifically, whether a flood of cases will frustrate the purpose of the Antiter-
rorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub L No 104-132, 110 Stat 1214, codi-
fied in various sections of Title 28. Again, the cases in this set are ones in which the stat-
ed concern is primarily focused on the federal courts.  
 187 344 US 443 (1953). In point of fact, the Supreme Court considered three separate 
cases in its opinion: Brown v Allen, Speller v Allen, and Daniels v Allen. Id at 443. 
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seen as the case that “ushered in the modern era of federal ha-
beas corpus,”188 standing for the proposition that constitutional 
challenges considered in state court could nevertheless be raised 
in a federal habeas petition.189 Justice Jackson had reservations 
about the decision, and wrote separately to express his concern 
about the effect of the Court’s decision on its habeas jurispru-
dence: “[T]his Court has sanctioned progressive trivialization of 
the writ [of habeas corpus] until floods of stale, frivolous and 
repetitious petitions inundate the docket of the lower courts and 
swell our own.”190 The Justice then famously issued a warning 
about these effects: “It must prejudice the occasional meritorious 
application to be buried in a flood of worthless ones. He who 
must search a haystack for a needle is likely to end up with the 
attitude that the needle is not worth the search.”191 
Justice Jackson’s characteristically quotable opinion identi-
fied broad themes that have continued to animate the Court’s 
habeas jurisprudence: the risk of obscuring meritorious habeas 
claims in a sea of frivolous ones, and the possibility that frivo-
lous cases might drown out cases in other areas of law. In habe-
as appeals, unlike in Bivens appeals, the justices have had to 
consider how to balance these concerns often in the midst of 
statutory interpretation—in deciphering either text or congres-
sional intent. 
In Harris v Reed,192 the Court considered whether a proce-
dural-default rule would bar consideration of a federal claim on 
habeas review if the state court rendering the judgment failed to 
say clearly that its judgment rested on the procedural default.193 
A majority of the Court decided that the answer was no,194 but 
Justice Kennedy dissented, arguing that the Court’s decision 
 
 188 John H. Blume, Sheri Lynn Johnson, and Keir M. Weyble, In Defense of Noncapi-
tal Habeas: A Response to Hoffman and King, 96 Cornell L Rev 435, 440 (2011). See also 
Max Rosenn, The Great Writ—A Reflection of Societal Change, 44 Ohio St L J 337, 345 
(1983) (“The commencement of the modern era of habeas corpus may be traced to the 
Court’s historic decision in 1953 in the Brown v. Allen cases.”). 
 189 Allen, 344 US at 458. 
 190 Id at 536 (Jackson concurring).  
 191 Id at 537 (Jackson concurring). Ultimately Justice Jackson joined in the result of 
the case, but he espoused a different, more limited role for federal courts in the review of 
habeas petitions. Id at 545–48. See also Richard H. Fallon Jr and Daniel J. Meltzer, New 
Law, Non-retroactivity, and Constitutional Remedies, 104 Harv L Rev 1731, 1814–15 
(1991) (describing Justice Jackson’s theory of habeas corpus from Brown v Allen). 
 192 489 US 255 (1989).  
 193 Id at 259–60.  
 194 Id at 266. See also Jason Mazzone, When the Supreme Court Is Not Supreme, 104 
Nw U L Rev 979, 1023 (2010) (delineating the majority’s analysis in the case).  
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would have a harmful effect on the federal judiciary. Specifical-
ly, he argued that “[t]he majority’s decision can only increase 
prisoner litigation and add to the burden on the federal 
courts.”195 That burden, to Justice Kennedy, would be comprised 
largely of unmeritorious claims: “It is well known ‘that prisoner 
actions occupy a disproportionate amount of the time and energy 
of the federal judiciary,’ and that many of these petitions are en-
tirely frivolous.”196 
The majority responded directly to Justice Kennedy’s dis-
sent by claiming, as justices have in response to earlier flood-
gates arguments, that there was little reason to think that a 
flood would be unleashed by its decision. Writing for the majori-
ty, Justice Blackmun argued that “the dissent’s fear that our 
holding will submerge courts in a flood of improper prisoner pe-
titions is unrealistic: a state court that wishes to rely on a pro-
cedural bar rule in a one-line pro forma order easily can write 
that ‘relief is denied for reasons of procedural default.’”197 Again, 
the counterargument from the Court was not that a flood of cas-
es would be irrelevant, but that no such flood was likely. 
The floodgates debate in Harris echoed many of those dis-
cussed in the Bivens context: an argument was made that a po-
tential decision would open the floodgates, which was followed 
by a denial that the gates would actually be opened. In that 
sense, Harris did not differ much from the policy-making cases 
discussed above. But in Artuz v Bennett198 the Court found that 
the statutory nature of the habeas question at issue flatly pre-
cluded the consideration of a potential flood.199 The question in 
Artuz was whether an application for state postconviction relief 
containing procedurally barred claims could nevertheless be 
“properly filed” within the meaning of the Antiterrorism and Ef-
fective Death Penalty Act of 1996200 (AEDPA).201 A unanimous 
 
 195 Harris, 489 US at 282 n 6 (Kennedy dissenting). 
 196 Id at 282–83 n 6 (Kennedy dissenting) (citation omitted), quoting Rose v Mitchell, 
443 US 545, 584 (1979) (Powell concurring). Specifically, Justice Kennedy noted that 
“[i]n the year ending June 30, 1987, almost 10,000 habeas corpus petitions were filed by 
state prisoners” and argued that “[t]his monumental burden is unlikely to be alleviated 
by a rule that . . . requires federal courts to resolve the merits of defaulted claims.” Har-
ris, 489 US at 282–83 n 6 (Kennedy dissenting). 
 197 Harris, 489 US at 265 n 12 (majority) (citation omitted). 
 198 531 US 4 (2000).  
 199 Id at 10. 
 200 Pub L No 104-132, 110 Stat 1214, codified in various sections of Title 28. 
 201 Artuz, 531 US at 5 (“[T]he time during which a properly filed application for 
State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or 
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Court held that it was.202 Toward the end of the opinion, the 
Court took up a floodgates argument made by the respondent—
that allowing such claims would “trigger a flood of protective fil-
ings in federal courts, absorbing their resources in threshold in-
terpretations of state procedural rules.”203 The Court quickly 
dismissed the argument: “Whatever merits these and other poli-
cy arguments may have, it is not the province of this Court to 
rewrite the statute to accommodate them. We hold as we do be-
cause respondent’s view seems to us the only permissible inter-
pretation of the text.”204 
Artuz contains important clues about the justices’ views on 
the weight of court-centered floodgates concerns and how those 
concerns can or should play a role in statutory interpretation. In 
Artuz, the Court’s unanimity and the language of the decision 
itself suggest that the Justices saw the question of statutory in-
terpretation as a relatively straightforward one. By declining to 
consider “policy arguments” about floodgates in the face of this 
“only permissible interpretation,” the Justices did not rule out 
the possibility of court-centered floodgates concerns playing a 
role in other cases where the statutory language was less 
clear.205 
 
claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsec-
tion.”), quoting 28 USC § 2244(d)(2) (1994). 
 202 Artuz, 531 US at 10–11. 
 203 Id at 10. 
 204 Id. See also John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 
Colum L Rev 70, 108–09 & n 141 (2006) (describing how judges are bound by the means 
Congress has selected for effectuating its purposes, and citing Artuz, among other cases, 
for the proposition that this sentiment has “become common in the Court’s statutory 
decisions”).  
 For an example of this reasoning outside the habeas context, see Neitzke v Williams, 
490 US 319 (1989). In Neitzke, the Court considered the question “whether a complaint 
filed in forma pauperis which fails to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
12(b)(6) is automatically frivolous within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d).” Id at 320. 
Petitioning prison officials urged the Court to answer the question in the affirmative, 
“primarily on the policy ground that such a reading will halt the ‘flood of frivolous litiga-
tion’ generated by prisoners that has swept over the federal judiciary.” Id at 325, quoting 
Brief for Petitioners, Neitzke v Williams, No 87-1882, *7 (filed Nov 17, 1988) (available 
on Westlaw at 1988 WL 1025738). The Court ultimately concluded, 
[O]ur role in appraising petitioners’ reading of § 1915(d) is not to make policy, 
but to interpret a statute. Taking this approach, it is evident that the failure-
to-state-a-claim standard of Rule 12(b)(6) and the frivolousness standard of § 
1915(d) were devised to serve distinctive goals . . . [but] it does not follow that a 
complaint which falls afoul of the former standard will invariably fall afoul of 
the latter. 
Neitzke, 490 US at 326.  
 205 Artuz, 531 US at 10. 
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And in fact, in a series of 5–4 decisions following Artuz, the 
Court seemed to back away from the apparently definitive rejec-
tion of court-centered floodgates concerns in statutory cases. In 
deciding that a timely filed petition that contained procedurally 
barred claims was “properly filed” within § 2244(d)(2) of AEDPA, 
the Court in Artuz explicitly reserved the question of whether a 
petition rejected by the state court as untimely could still be 
“properly filed” under the same section.206 Pace v DiGuglielmo207 
confronted that question. A majority of the Court held that the 
answer was no and that the federal petition at issue in the case 
was time barred.208 Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Souter, 
Ginsburg, and Breyer, dissented. They argued that the majori-
ty’s result was not compelled by the text of the provision and, 
moreover, that it would frustrate the purpose of that provision—
the need to avoid burdening district courts:209 “Unfortunately, 
the most likely consequence of the Court’s new rule will be to in-
crease, not reduce, delays in the federal system. The inevitable 
result of today’s decision will be a flood of protective filings in 
the federal district courts.”210 Although Justice Stevens framed 
his argument partially in terms of being deferential to Con-
gress,211 he also made clear that his concern was with flooding 
federal courts with petitions, arguing, “I fail to see any merit in 
a rule that knowingly and unnecessarily ‘add[s] to the bur-
dens on the district courts in a way that simple tolling . . . 
would not.’”212 
Finally, the same court-centered floodgates concerns that 
were rejected in Artuz and accepted by four Justices in Pace ap-
parently drove the outcome in the 2007 case of Schriro v Land-
rigan.213 In Schriro, the Court held that a district court did not 
abuse its discretion, as defined by AEDPA, when it denied a 
convicted state prisoner an evidentiary hearing in connection 
with his ineffective assistance of counsel claim.214 The same four 
Justices who dissented in Pace also dissented in Schriro, though 
 
 206 Id at 8–9 & n 2. 
 207 544 US 408 (2005).  
 208 Id at 410. 
 209 Id at 420 (Stevens dissenting). 
 210 Id at 429 (Stevens dissenting). 
 211 See Pace, 544 US at 427 (Stevens dissenting). See also note 186. 
 212 Pace, 544 US at 429 (Stevens dissenting) (alterations in original), quoting Dun-
can v Walker, 533 US 167, 192 (2001) (Breyer dissenting).  
 213 550 US 465 (2007). 
 214 Id at 472–73.  
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this time they came out the other way on floodgates concerns. 
Justice Stevens, again joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and 
Breyer, made plain that he thought the majority’s decision was 
motivated by a concern about case volume, stating, “In the end, 
the Court’s decision can only be explained by its increasingly 
familiar effort to guard the floodgates of litigation.”215 Relying 
upon the floodgates leitmotif, the dissenting Justices made the 
argument that a flood was unlikely to follow from their proposed 
holding: 
[H]abeas cases requiring evidentiary hearings have been 
“few in number,” and “there is no clear evidence that this 
particular classification of habeas proceedings has burdened 
the dockets of the federal courts.” Even prior to the passage 
of [AEDPA], district courts held evidentiary hearings in on-
ly 1.17% of all federal habeas cases. This figure makes it 
abundantly clear that doing justice does not always cause 
the heavens to fall.216 
In short, within just a few-year span the Court had done some-
thing of an about-face; the same Justices who were earlier wor-
ried about flooding the courts with protective filings in Pace 
were now suggesting, somewhat disparagingly, that the majority 
was being motivated by case volume concerns in Schriro (and 
according to the dissent, the Justices who had earlier failed to 
embrace the floodgates argument found it dispositive this time 
around).  
A close reading of this set of habeas cases217 demonstrates a 
few critical points. First, the Court has consistently been sensitive 
 
 215 Id at 499 (Stevens dissenting). As evidence of this motivation, the dissent noted 
that the majority had commented on how requiring the hearing would affect the lower 
federal courts:  
Immediately before turning to the facts of this case, [the majority] states that 
“[i]f district courts were required to allow federal habeas applicants to develop 
even the most insubstantial factual allegations in evidentiary hearings, district 
courts would be forced to reopen factual disputes that were conclusively re-
solved in the state courts.”  
Id (Stevens dissenting) (second alteration in original), quoting id at 475 (majority). 
 216 Schriro, 550 US at 499–500 (Stevens dissenting) (citations omitted), quoting 
Keeney v Tamayo-Reyes, 504 US 1, 24 (Kennedy dissenting).  
 217 An additional data point can be found beyond the set of traditional habeas cases. 
In Ryder v United States, 515 US 177 (1995), the Court held that the actions of two civil-
ian judges who served on the Court of Military Review, but who had not been appointed 
in accordance with the dictates of the Appointments Clause, were not valid de facto. Id at 
179. The Court reached its holding over a concern on the part of the government that “a 
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to how its decisions will affect the future volume of claims com-
ing into federal courts—particularly frivolous ones. Second, 
while, as in the Bivens context, numerous factors are at work in 
these different decisions, one such factor in this context seems to 
be the clarity of the underlying statutory provision. The Justices 
unanimously rejected floodgates considerations in Artuz on the 
ground that the text in question led to a clear result. Absent 
straightforward interpretation, the justices appear to have been 
willing to turn to floodgates reasoning. And third, in cases that 
lack the straightforward statutory interpretation present in 
Artuz, the Court has fractured, and indeed, the justices them-
selves have gone back and forth, on just when floodgates reason-
ing should be dispositive.218  
3. Prisoner cases. 
The Bivens cases showed the Court considering arguments 
about increasing frivolous filings in the context of judicial policy 
making; the habeas cases showed the same for statutory inter-
pretation. To round out the picture of how the Court has ad-
dressed these concerns, it is worth considering cases that raise 
floodgates arguments in the constitutional realm. 
Here, it is useful to look to a set of constitutional challeng-
es in which concerns about future litigation have consistently 
 
flood of habeas corpus petitions will ensue”—a concern that the Court dismissed, without 
further elaboration, as having “little basis” in past precedent. Id at 185. 
 218 Bringing the point full circle, several of the Justices recently returned to Justice 
Jackson’s language in Allen to express their own concerns about the current state of ha-
beas corpus:  
It has now been 60 years since Brown v. Allen, in which we struck the Faustian 
bargain that traded the simple elegance of the common-law writ of habeas cor-
pus for federal-court power to probe the substantive merits of state-court con-
victions. Even after AEDPA’s pass through the Augean stables, no one in a po-
sition to observe the functioning of our byzantine federal-habeas system can 
believe it an efficient device for separating the truly deserving from the multi-
tude of prisoners pressing false claims. “[F]loods of stale, frivolous and repeti-
tious petitions inundate the docket of the lower courts and swell our own. . . . It 
must prejudice the occasional meritorious applicant to be buried in a flood of 
worthless ones.” 
 
The “inundation” that Justice Jackson lamented in 1953 “consisted of 541” fed-
eral habeas petitions filed by state prisoners. By 1969, that number had grown 
to 7,359. In the year ending on September 30, 2012, 15,929 such petitions were 
filed. Today’s decision piles yet more dead weight onto a postconviction habeas 
system already creaking at its rusted joints.  
McQuiggin, 133 S Ct at 1942–43 (Scalia dissenting) (citations omitted). 
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appeared: cases brought by prisoners. As noted earlier, the jus-
tices have long been wary of frivolous prisoner filings,219 and in 
several cases, they have considered whether to factor concerns 
about increasing frivolous filings into their decisions. Although 
the justices have considered the possibility of new cases arising 
from a variety of decisions,220 it will suffice to examine two—one 
challenging a search within a cell and another challenging the 
use of excessive force—that largely involve Fourth and Eighth 
Amendment claims, respectively. 
The first example is the 1984 case Hudson v Palmer,221 in 
which a majority of the Court held that an inmate had no rea-
sonable expectation of privacy in his prison cell such that he was 
entitled to Fourth Amendment protection.222 Justice Stevens, 
joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun, dissented, 
challenging both the merits of the decision223 and the motivation 
behind it: “I cannot help but think that the Court’s holding is in-
fluenced by an unstated fear that if it recognizes that prisoners 
 
 219 See, for example, Harris, 489 US at 282–83 n 6 (Kennedy dissenting) (“It is well 
known ‘that prisoner actions occupy a disproportionate amount of the time and energy of 
the federal judiciary,’ and that many of these petitions are entirely frivolous.”), quoting 
Rose v Mitchell, 443 US 545, 584 (1979) (Powell concurring); Cruz v Beto, 405 US 319, 
326–27 (1972) (Rehnquist dissenting) (“The inmate stands to gain something and lose 
nothing from a complaint stating facts that he is ultimately unable to prove. Though he 
may be denied legal relief, he will nonetheless have obtained a short sabbatical in the 
nearest federal courthouse.”). 
 220 For examples of cases in which the Court has considered whether a flood of cases 
will follow from decisions based on the manner of execution, see Baze v Rees, 553 US 35, 
70 (2008) (Alito concurring) (arguing that the dissent’s proposed standard of whether the 
manner of execution would create an “untoward” risk of pain “would open the gates for a 
flood of litigation that would go a long way toward bringing about the end of the death 
penalty as a practical matter”); Nelson v Campbell, 541 US 637, 649 (2004): 
Respondents argue that a decision to reverse the judgment of the Eleventh Cir-
cuit would open the floodgates to all manner of method-of-execution challenges, 
as well as last minute stay requests. But, because we do not here resolve the 
question of how to treat method-of-execution claims generally, our holding is 
extremely limited. 
There of course have also been prisoner cases outside the constitutional realm that raise 
floodgates concerns. See, for example, Cleavinger v Saxner, 474 US 193, 207 (1985) (“We 
[ ] are not impressed with the argument that anything less than absolute immunity [for 
members of federal prison’s Institution Discipline Committee] will result in a flood of 
litigation and in substantial procedural burdens and expense for committee members.”).  
 221 468 US 517 (1984).  
 222 See id at 530. See also Orin S. Kerr, Four Models of Fourth Amendment Protec-
tion, 60 Stan L Rev 503, 521 (2007) (describing the Court’s expectation-of-privacy analy-
sis in Palmer). 
 223 Palmer, 468 US at 558 (Stevens concurring in part and dissenting in part) (argu-
ing that affording an inmate no constitutional protection over his own property—from “a 
photo of a child to a letter from a wife”—contravened a longstanding “ethical tradition”). 
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have any Fourth Amendment protection this will lead to a flood 
of frivolous lawsuits.”224 He then responded to this possible moti-
vation by stating that “[o]f course, this type of burden is not suf-
ficient to justify a judicial modification of the requirements of 
law.”225 Justice Stevens went on to suggest that no reason exist-
ed to think that a flood of cases would even come, claiming that 
“the lower courts have permitted such suits to be brought for 
some time now without disastrous results.”226 
These arguments presaged those that Justice Stevens would 
later make in his Pace and Schriro dissents—the habeas cases 
discussed above. But in Palmer, Justice Stevens went on to sug-
gest other ways that courts could protect themselves from poten-
tial floods instead of “modif[ying]” the “requirements of law.”227 
Specifically, he argued that “costs can be awarded against the 
plaintiff when frivolous cases are brought. Even modest assess-
ments against prisoners’ accounts could provide an effective 
weapon for deterring truly groundless litigation.”228 
Eight years later, the Court was less willing to embrace a 
floodgates argument. In Hudson v McMillian,229 the Court con-
fronted whether the use of “excessive physical force” against an 
inmate violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against 
cruel and unusual punishment when the inmate does not actual-
ly suffer serious injury.230 Justice O’Connor, writing for a majori-
ty of the Court, answered that question in the affirmative.231 The 
Court reached its holding over the arguments made by respond-
ents, who were joined by five states as amici curiae, that limit-
ing Eighth Amendment violations to those involving “significant 
injury” was necessary to limit the number of filings by in-
mates.232 Although the majority did not address the propriety of 
 
 224 Id at 554 n 30 (Stevens concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
 225 Id (Stevens concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
 226 Id (Stevens concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citation omitted).  
 227 Palmer, 468 US at 554 n 30 (Stevens concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
 228 Id (Stevens concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citation omitted), citing 
Hoover v Ronwin, 466 US 558, 601 n 27 (1984) (Stevens dissenting).  
 229 503 US 1 (1992).  
 230 Id at 4. See also Sharon Dolovich, Cruelty, Prison Conditions, and the Eighth 
Amendment, 84 NYU L Rev 881, 905–06 (2009) (generally assessing the facts of the 
case).  
 231 McMillian, 503 US at 4. 
 232 Id at 14 (Blackmun concurring), citing Brief Amici Curiae for the States of Texas, 
Hawaii, Nevada, Wyoming, and Florida, Hudson v McMillian, No 90-6531, *21 (filed Aug 
12, 1991) (available on Lexis at 1990 US Briefs 6531) (“Texas Amicus Brief”). Texas, in 
particular, noted that the “significant injury requirement has been very effective in the 
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these arguments, Justice Blackmun took them on directly in his 
concurrence: “This audacious approach to the Eighth Amend-
ment assumes that the interpretation of an explicit constitu-
tional protection is to be guided by pure policy preferences for 
the paring down of prisoner petitions. . . . [T]his inherently 
self-interested concern has no appropriate role in interpreting the 
contours of a substantive constitutional right.”233 
Of course, this very same “inherently self-interested con-
cern” had, at least according to the dissenters, shaped the 
Court’s decision less than a decade earlier in Palmer. After 
forcefully rejecting the validity of that concern in McMillian, 
Justice Blackmun went on to argue that, “in any event,” the 
Court’s ruling “does not open the floodgates for filings by prison 
inmates.”234 The Justice pointed to several other gatekeeping 
mechanisms already in place, including that inmates were re-
quired to exhaust administrative remedies before filing suit, and 
that the district court could dismiss an inmate’s complaint in 
forma pauperis if the court was satisfied that the action was 
frivolous or malicious.235 Justice Blackmun concluded that “[t]hese 
measures should be adequate to control any docket-management 
problems that might result from meritless prisoner claims.”236 
In neither of these two decisions—Palmer and McMillian—
did a majority of the Court openly rely on floodgates arguments 
as a consideration in interpreting the Constitution. That said, if 
the dissent in Palmer is to be believed, concerns about creating 
more unmeritorious litigation played a significant role in driving 
the Court’s decision in that case. It is therefore interesting that, 
not long after, the Court did not accept the floodgates argument 
in McMillian, and one Justice went so far as to express hostility 
to the suggestion that it would. Although these two cases alone 
cannot provide a comprehensive account of how the Court has 
viewed court-centered floodgates arguments regarding frivolous 
cases in the constitutional realm, they suggest, consistent with 
the other cases discussed here, that the Court has wrestled with 
when it can consider these concerns, and certainly has not 
barred their consideration. 
 
Fifth Circuit in helping to control its system-wide docket management problems.” 
McMillian, 503 US at 4 (Blackmun concurring), quoting Texas Amicus Brief at *21.  
 233 McMillian, 503 US at 15 (Blackmun concurring) (emphasis added). 
 234 Id (Blackmun concurring).  
 235 Id at 15–16 (Blackmun concurring). 
 236 Id at 16 (Blackmun concurring). 
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In short, these cases together paint a picture about how the 
Court has struggled with whether and when to take into account 
its concerns about increasing the federal courts’ caseload—
particularly with frivolous cases. Justices and various parties 
have raised these concerns numerous times over the past several 
decades. Sometimes a majority of the Court is receptive, as in 
Wilkie;237 other times the Court rejects all such considerations, 
as in Artuz.238 Part of the story, of course, is under what circum-
stances the Court is asked to contemplate increases in litigation. 
It should be no surprise that some of the Court’s soundest rejec-
tions of these considerations have come in cases in which it is in-
terpreting a statute or a constitutional right. Yet it is important 
to recognize that floodgates reasoning comes into play even in 
these cases, and important as well to recognize that even in the 
policy-making realm of Bivens, the Court has vacillated on 
whether court-centered concerns can appropriately be taken into 
account in reaching a substantive decision. A close analysis of 
these cases reveals the fragility of the Court’s position, in turn 
suggesting the fragility of its normative foundation.239 
B. Burdening the Courts with Standard Claims  
The previous Section demonstrated that concerns about in-
undating the federal courts with frivolous cases seem to have 
shaped at least some of the Court’s decisions. One might wonder 
how the Court has responded to cases in which the merits of the 
claims in the flood were not in doubt. As it turns out, even in 
those cases, members of the Court apparently have been recep-
tive to floodgates concerns. 
As one prominent example, floodgates concerns were 
raised—and were perhaps deeply influential—in the gerryman-
dering case of Vieth v Jubelirer240 in 2004. The case involved a 
challenge to a Pennsylvania redistricting plan on the ground 
that it constituted an unconstitutional political gerrymander.241 
A plurality of the Court decided that the claims were nonjustici-
able.242 In his dissent, Justice Stevens suggested that the plurality 
 
 237 See notes 173–77 and accompanying text. 
 238 See notes 198–204 and accompanying text. 
 239 See Part IV. 
 240 541 US 267 (2004).  
 241 Id at 271 (plurality). 
 242 Id at 306. See also Heather K. Gerken, Lost in the Political Thicket: The Court, 
Election Law, and the Doctrinal Interregnum, 153 U Pa L Rev 503, 506 (2004).  
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was swayed by a floodgates fear: “The plurality’s reluctance to 
recognize the justiciability of partisan gerrymanders seems 
driven in part by a fear that recognizing such claims will give 
rise to a flood of litigation.”243 The Justice then gave one of the 
typical floodgates rejoinders—arguing that a flood was unlikely 
to follow. Noting that the plurality had compiled a list of gerry-
mandering cases since the 1986 case of Davis v Bandemer,244 
Justice Stevens wrote: “[T]he list of cases that [the plurality] 
cites in its lengthy footnote suggests that in the two decades 
since Bandemer, there has been an average of just three or four 
partisan gerrymandering cases filed every year.”245 To put that 
figure in perspective, the Justice noted that it “is obviously triv-
ial when compared, for example, to the amount of litigation that 
followed our adoption of the ‘one-person, one-vote’ rule.”246 If 
Justice Stevens’s account of what was motivating the majority is 
correct, Vieth provides an example not just of the Court altering 
a decision out of general floodgates concerns, but also of the 
Court deciding not to review a case at all. 
More recently, Justice Sotomayor similarly pushed back on 
what she took to be the workload concerns of the majority. In 
Perry v New Hampshire,247 the Justice challenged the majority’s 
assessment that requiring an inquiry into the reliability of an 
eyewitness identification beyond police-arranged suggestive cir-
cumstances would “entail a heavy practical burden” on the lower 
courts.248 In her dissent, Justice Sotomayor noted, inter alia, 
that “[t]here has been no flood of claims in the four Federal Cir-
cuits that, having seen no basis for an arrangement-based dis-
tinction in our precedents, have long indicated that due process 
scrutiny applies to all suggestive identification procedures.”249 
Justice Sotomayor invoked the flood metaphor to dispel the no-
tion that extending the requirement of a reliability inquiry 
would actually lead to an increase in the burden on lower 
courts—a factor that appeared relevant to the majority.250 
 
 243 Vieth, 541 US at 326 n 14 (Stevens dissenting).  
 244 478 US 109 (1986). 
 245 Vieth, 541 US at 326 n 14 (Stevens dissenting) (citation omitted). 
 246 Id (Stevens dissenting), citing Reynolds v Sims, 377 US 533 (1964). 
 247 132 S Ct 716 (2012). 
 248 Id at 737–38 (Sotomayor dissenting). 
 249 Id (Sotomayor dissenting).  
 250 See id at 727 (majority). Again, this is not to suggest that workload was a dispos-
itive or even significant factor to the Court in Perry. For an analysis of the Court’s rea-
soning in the case and its jurisprudence on eyewitness identifications more broadly, see 
generally Brandon L. Garrett, Eyewitnesses and Exclusion, 65 Vand L Rev 451 (2012).  
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And in an interesting twist, four dissenting Justices sug-
gested that the majority had failed to sufficiently take floodgates 
concerns into account in the 2011 case Stern v Marshall.251 The 
core questions in that case were whether a bankruptcy court 
judge had the statutory authority to enter a final judgment on a 
counterclaim for tortious interference and, if so, whether that 
statutory authority violated Article III of the Constitution.252 
The majority concluded that the answer to both questions was 
yes, meaning that from that point on, compulsory counterclaims 
could not be resolved in bankruptcy courts.253 Justice Breyer, 
joined by Justices Ginsburg, Kagan, and Sotomayor, dissented, 
and devoted an entire section of the opinion to the practical con-
sequences of the Court’s decision: 
[U]nder the majority’s holding, the federal district judge, 
not the bankruptcy judge, would have to hear and resolve 
the counterclaim. Why is that a problem? Because these 
types of disputes arise in bankruptcy court with some fre-
quency. Because the volume of bankruptcy cases is stagger-
ing, involving almost 1.6 million filings last year, compared 
to a federal district court docket of around 280,000 civil cas-
es and 78,000 criminal cases. . . . Because under these cir-
cumstances, a constitutionally required game of jurisdic-
tional ping-pong between courts would lead to inefficiency, 
increased cost, delay, and needless additional suffering 
among those faced with bankruptcy.254 
What is unclear from this section is how the dissenting Justices 
thought the volume concerns should affect the Court’s decision. 
Unlike the majority, the dissent concluded that the statute was 
constitutional; one is left to wonder, then, if the dissent meant to 
imply that the majority should have similarly adopted a broader 
reading of Article III to avoid these results.255 What is clear, 
 
 251 131 S Ct 2594 (2011).  
 252 Id at 2600.  
 253 Id at 2620. See also Rafael I. Pardo and Kathryn A. Watts, The Structural Excep-
tionalism of Bankruptcy Administration, 60 UCLA L Rev 384, 417–18 (2012).  
 254 Stern, 131 S Ct at 2630 (Breyer dissenting) (citations omitted). 
 255 The majority, for its part, responded to this concern (as raised by the estate of 
Vickie Lynn Marshall and amici) by stating: “It goes without saying that ‘the fact that a 
given law or procedure is efficient, convenient, and useful in facilitating functions of gov-
ernment, standing alone, will not save it if it is contrary to the Constitution.’” Id at 2619 
(majority), quoting INS v Chadha, 462 US 919, 944 (1983). The Court went on to note 
that “[i]n addition, we are not convinced that the practical consequences of such limitations 
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however, is that the dissent thought an increase in filings to the 
district court was a truly problematic byproduct of the Court’s 
decision and, it seems, should even somehow have been factored 
into that decision. 
In all of these cases, at least some members of the Court 
were concerned about—or concerned that other members of the 
Court were concerned about—how the federal judiciary would be 
affected by a significant increase in caseload. And importantly, 
neither Vieth nor Perry contains even a suggestion that the mer-
its of the claims in the flood had anything to do with the majori-
ty’s apparent desire to avoid them. Likewise, the dissenting Jus-
tices in Stern made plain that their concern was with how the 
judiciary would face a higher number of cases, not frivolous cas-
es, and how the eventual delays would affect the parties. In light 
of the strain that has existed on these courts over the past sev-
eral decades, the underlying fear in all these cases seems to be 
that an expansion of the docket will simply make it more diffi-
cult for the courts to administer justice. Ultimately, the fact that 
the Court has gone back and forth on whether and when to take 
these concerns into account reveals the shaky foundation that 
the court-centered floodgates argument rests upon. In the final 
Part, I begin to address the normative questions about using all 
manner of floodgates arguments in shaping substantive law. 
IV.  EVALUATING FLOODGATES ARGUMENTS 
The preceding Parts have identified and unpacked the pri-
mary types of floodgates arguments that the Supreme Court has 
considered. In doing so, however, the discussion has underscored 
a set of difficult normative questions: Should floodgates argu-
ments ever be considered in the Court’s decision making? If so, 
when and why? And in such cases where it might be legitimate 
for the Court to rely on floodgates reasoning, is it sufficient for a 
party or the Court itself to assert that a deluge of cases will 
surely follow, or is more required to turn the outcome of the 
case? In light of the fact that the justices have considered such 
arguments in more than sixty cases256—and this consideration 
has increased significantly over the last few terms257—the need 
 
on the authority of bankruptcy courts to enter final judgments are as significant as Vick-
ie and the dissent suggest.” Stern, 131 S Ct at 2619.  
 256 See note 31. 
 257 See note 3 and accompanying text. 
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to have purchase on these questions has become all the more 
pressing. 
Answering these questions is no easy task. It is no accident 
that the Court has fractured—and, indeed, that individual jus-
tices have gone back and forth—on these very matters. A large 
part of the difficulty lies in the fact that these questions cannot 
be answered in a wholesale manner. As the preceding discussion 
demonstrates, floodgates arguments vary considerably based 
upon the institution that is being affected by the flood and what 
kinds of cases the feared flood contains.  
And yet, what makes these questions challenging to answer 
is also what illuminates one way to begin to answer them. As 
the analysis here shows, floodgates arguments often are best 
understood as a subset of a larger category of normative argu-
ments—about the relationship between courts and Congress, for 
example, or about the relationship between the federal and state 
court systems. The primary goal of this Part is to situate the 
various floodgates arguments in the appropriate normative con-
texts. As this Part demonstrates, once situated, the use of some 
floodgates arguments becomes fairly easily defensible, while the 
use of others—precisely because they are not supported by ac-
cepted lines of doctrine and practice—becomes far more questionable.  
Specifically, Part IV.A considers the arguments based on 
other-regarding concerns—both interbranch and intersystemic—
and argues that they are tied to the constitutional principles of 
separation of powers and federalism, as well as the doctrines of 
qualified immunity and abstention. These ties, in turn, suggest 
that the consideration of other-regarding floodgates is defensi-
ble. To be clear, the fact that these floodgates arguments have 
footing in constitutional principles and doctrine does not suggest 
that they should be immune from scrutiny or that they should 
always prevail; the point is simply that this grounding at least 
gives them a prima facie claim to legitimacy. 
Part IV.B then considers court-centered floodgates argu-
ments and finds them to be on shakier ground. The Court is vin-
dicating no well-established constitutional principle when it de-
fends the federal courts’ docket from caseload pressures, and 
these arguments have no clear doctrinal or theoretical analogue. 
The use of court-centered floodgates arguments therefore re-
quires some affirmative justification, which neither the Court 
nor commentators have provided. Moreover, there is reason to 
be skeptical of this kind of prudential argument, as shaping the 
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docket of the federal courts is generally understood to come un-
der the purview of Congress, and not the Court. Accordingly, 
this Section concludes that the justices should let the lower 
courts rely on the other tools that they have at their disposal—
such as case-management practices258—to respond to docket 
pressures, rather than altering substantive law.  
The remaining objective of this Part is to briefly consider 
the follow-up question to the central normative one—that is, if 
there are some circumstances in which it is defensible for the 
Court to entertain a floodgates argument, what kind of analysis 
or even evidence is required to affect the outcome of a case? Ac-
cordingly, Part IV.C offers some initial thoughts on the mini-
mum amount of support a floodgates argument should have for 
that argument to be dispositive. 
A. Interbranch and Intersystemic Concerns 
Many of the floodgates arguments are “other regarding”—
meaning that the Court considers them to avoid encroaching up-
on Congress, burdening the executive, or upsetting the balance 
between the federal and state court systems. Each of these con-
cerns can be connected in some way to basic structural constitu-
tional principles or doctrinal rules that courts employ in a varie-
ty of contexts to deny parties the relief they might otherwise 
receive so that the courts can protect another government insti-
tution or dynamic with that institution. This gives other-
regarding floodgates arguments a relatively stable normative 
footing that helps justify their consideration. 
1. Judicial-legislative concerns. 
The floodgates arguments that are most easily defensible 
are the ones raised in the judicial-legislative context. As dis-
cussed in Part I.B, the justices have considered two major con-
cerns within this context. The first is that a flood of new cases 
following a particular statutory decision would be problematic 
because it would demonstrate that the Court had contravened 
congressional intent and possibly even demonstrate the degree 
of that transgression. A classic example of this kind of concern 
comes from Justice Douglas’s dissent in De Beers: “The decision, 
if followed, will open the flood gates to review of interlocutory 
 
 258 See generally Levy, 61 Duke L J 315 (cited in note 35). 
 2013] Judging the Flood of Litigation 1059 
 
decrees. It circumvents the policy of Congress to restrict review 
in these cases to final judgments.”259 The second subset of con-
cerns is an extension of the first—specifically, that a flood of new 
cases would not just demonstrate a disregard for congressional 
intent but, in fact, an appropriation of the legislative function 
through unilateral expansion of jurisdiction. This sentiment is 
captured well by Chief Justice Burger’s dissent in Solem, which 
described the Court’s decision as “judicial usurpation with a 
vengeance.”260 
The normative foundations of these two forms of judicial-
legislative floodgates arguments are not difficult to identify, nor, 
for many, are they hard to embrace. Within the first kind of 
floodgates argument, the justices are endeavoring to construe 
the law correctly, and using the possibility of a flood as an indi-
cation that the Court has failed to do so. In this way, the flood-
gates argument becomes part and parcel of an approach to stat-
utory interpretation that tries to give effect to the apparent 
intention or purpose of Congress.261 The second type of floodgates 
argument is an extension of the first, in that the justices are 
concerned that the Court’s reading of a particular statute is so 
removed from what Congress intended that it essentially 
amounts to a usurpation of the legislative function. In this way, 
the floodgates arguments raised in the judicial-legislative con-
text can be justified by basic separation-of-powers principles. At 
bottom, they are supported by the age old notion that each 
branch has its “proper place[ ],”262 with Congress as the primary 
lawmaker and the Court as the law interpreter,263 and neither 
should invade the territory of another.264 
 
 259 De Beers Consolidated Mines, 325 US at 225 (Douglas dissenting). 
 260 Solem, 463 US at 315 (Burger dissenting). 
 261 The Court has routinely recognized this approach to statutory interpretation. 
See, for example, Flora v United States, 357 US 63, 65 (1958) (“In matters of statutory 
construction the duty of this Court is to give effect to the intent of Congress.”).  
 262 Federalist 51 (Madison), in The Federalist 347, 347–48 (Wesleyan 1961) (Jacob 
E. Cooke, ed). 
 263 See, for example, National Federation of Independent Business v Sebelius, 132 S 
Ct 2566, 2579 (2012) (“Members of this Court are vested with the authority to interpret 
the law; we possess neither the expertise nor the prerogative to make policy judgments. 
Those decisions are entrusted to our Nation’s elected leaders.”); Hepburn v Griswold, 75 
US 603, 611 (1869) (“All the legislative power granted by the Constitution belongs to 
Congress.”). Members of Congress have likewise echoed this sentiment. See, for example, 
Hearings on the Nomination of H. Lee Sarokin to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals be-
fore the Senate Judiciary Committee, 103d Cong, 2d Sess 27,526 (1994) (statement of 
Senator Phil Gramm) (“Sarokin Hearings”) (“[J]udges ought to be in the business of in-
terpreting laws, not making them.”); Sarokin Hearings, 103d Cong, 2d Sess at 27,470 
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To be clear, claiming that judicial-legislative floodgates ar-
guments have a prima facie legitimacy does not mean that rea-
sonable minds cannot differ on the matter of when these argu-
ments should be heeded. For example, there can be 
disagreements about whether the text of a particular statute is 
sufficiently clear such that one need not take into account the 
overarching purpose of the statute. Or even if there is agree-
ment that congressional will is relevant, there can be disagree-
ment about what that will is and how a potential flood of litiga-
tion would support or contravene it. The greater point is simply 
that these are arguments of a kind that we have seen before—
they are part and parcel of a type of statutory interpretation 
with ties to separation of powers, and therefore their considera-
tion is generally defensible. 
2. Judicial-executive concerns. 
Floodgates arguments made to protect the executive from 
becoming overburdened and to ensure a balance between the 
federal and state courts stand on less-sure footing. Although 
considering the possibility of a flood so as not to disregard con-
gressional intent fits comfortably with familiar themes in statu-
tory interpretation, that the Court has grounds to consider a 
flood while engaging in substantive analysis in these other areas 
is less clear. In particular, if Congress had wanted the Court to 
become involved in guarding these floodgates of litigation, it 
could have said so in framing the relevant substantive law. That 
said, even these arguments can be understood to have ties to 
familiar constitutional principles and lines of doctrine that 
 
(statement of Senator Orrin Hatch) (“What are judges for other than to implement the 
laws, to abide by them, to interpret them, not to make them.”); Hearings on the Nomina-
tion of Clarence Thomas to the Supreme Court, 100th Cong, 2d Sess 23,612 (1991) 
(statement of Senator Arlen Specter) (“Thomas Hearings”) (“[T]he Court is supposed to 
interpret law, not to make law.”). For these and similar statements, see Bernard W. Bell, 
R-E-S-P-E-C-T: Respecting Legislative Judgments in Interpretive Theory, 78 NC L Rev 
1253, 1254 n 1 (2000).  
 264 Federalist 48 (Madison), in The Federalist 332, 332 (cited in note 262) (describing 
power dynamics and potential consequences). See also Massachusetts v Mellon, 262 US 
447, 488 (1923): 
The functions of government under our system are apportioned. To the legisla-
tive department has been committed the duty of making laws; to the executive 
the duty of executing them; and to the judiciary the duty of interpreting and 
applying them in cases properly brought before the courts. The general rule is 
that neither department may invade the province of the other and neither may 
control, direct or restrain the action of the other.  
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protect the executive and state courts from excessive burdens—
ties which lend legitimacy to the use of these arguments. 
In the judicial-executive context, one prominent animating 
concern is that deciding a case in a particular way would create 
litigation that would ultimately burden the executive official in 
question. That burden, in turn, would make it difficult for the 
official to perform his duties. This is precisely the issue that Jus-
tice Blackmun raised in Bivens when he argued that an increase 
in lawsuits would “stultify” law enforcement265 and that Presi-
dent Clinton raised in Jones when he argued that additional lit-
igation would “impair the effective performance of his office.”266 
When understood in these terms, the executive floodgates ar-
guments share much in common with the doctrine of qualified 
immunity. 
As the Court itself has stated, immunity of public officers 
arose “to shield them from undue interference with their duties 
and from potentially disabling threats of liability.”267 This is why 
the Court has “consistently [ ] held that government officials are 
entitled to some form of immunity from suits for damages.”268 As 
a result, parties can be denied the relief that they would other-
wise receive, all to protect the executive from what the Court 
has called the “burdens of litigation.”269 Floodgates arguments in 
the context of the executive are based on the same principle. In 
the cases discussed here, the argument is that a private right of 
action should not be recognized or that litigation should be 
stayed—that is, parties should at least be temporarily denied 
the relief that they might otherwise receive—in order to protect 
the executive from burdensome litigation.  
Of course, this analogy has its limits, and the purpose of 
drawing it is not to suggest that all executive floodgates argu-
ments should prevail. Indeed, one might be inclined to reject the 
line of argument that seeks to protect members of the executive 
branch from burdensome litigation for a whole host of reasons. 
 
 265 Bivens, 403 US at 430 (Blackmun dissenting). 
 266 Jones, 520 US at 701–02. 
 267 Harlow v Fitzgerald, 457 US 800, 806 (1982). See also James E. Pfander and 
Jonathan L. Hunt, Public Wrongs and Private Bills: Indemnification and Government 
Accountability in the Early Republic, 85 NYU L Rev 1862, 1870 (2010) (noting how 
courts today view the purpose of qualified immunity as balancing the need to compen-
sate victims with ensuring that public officials are not “chill[ed]” in “the zealous dis-
charge of their appointed duties”).  
 268 Harlow, 457 US at 806. 
 269 Saucier v Katz, 533 US 194, 200–01 (2001). 
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The point is simply that the Court has relied upon some of the 
same concerns to justify creating immunity from suit before.270 
As such, floodgates arguments that are animated by a concern 
for shielding the executive have at least some legal footing, 
thereby rendering their consideration defensible.271 
3. Intersystemic concerns. 
The same may be said for the Court’s consideration of inter-
systemic floodgates arguments. In the intersystemic realm, the 
Court has raised concerns in two nearly opposite directions—
taking away too many cases that belong in state courts and 
flooding state courts with too many claims and obligations. A 
prime example of the first type of concern can be seen in Maze, 
in which Chief Justice Burger suggested that the majority was 
motivated by a desire “not to flood the federal courts” with cases 
perceived to be “more appropriately the business of the 
States.”272 Justice Ginsburg raised this same concern in her dis-
sent in Shady Grove, suggesting that, because of the Court’s de-
cision, federal courts would now become a “mecca” for “class ac-
tions seeking state-created penalties for claims arising under 
state law.”273 The second concern is on display in the parental-
termination cases—first Lassiter274 and then M.L.B.275—in which 
the Justices’ concern appears to be burdening state courts with 
too many claims and attendant obligations, such as providing 
parties with free transcripts. 
Both concerns are about volume, to be sure, but they are al-
so about ensuring, in the words of the Grable Court, that there 
is no “distort[ion] in the “division of labor between the state and 
federal courts.”276 In this way, these kinds of floodgates argu-
ments can be understood as having ties to federalism by main-
taining “a healthy balance” between the federal and state 
 
 270 As currently construed by the Court, qualified immunity is an immunity from 
suit, and not simply a defense on the merits. See Pearson v Callahan, 555 US 223, 237 
(2009).  
 271 In a similar vein, one can make the argument that floodgates arguments in the 
judicial-executive context bear some resemblance to political question doctrine, which 
likewise safeguards certain executive actions from judicial scrutiny on the ground that 
the executive needs freedom of action. Thanks to Professor Stephen Sachs for suggesting 
this argument.  
 272 Maze, 414 US at 407 (Burger dissenting).  
 273 Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, 130 S Ct at 1473 (Ginsburg dissenting).  
 274 Lassiter, 452 US at 58–59 (Blackmun dissenting).  
 275 M.L.B., 519 US at 129–30 (Thomas dissenting).  
 276 Grable & Sons Metal Products, 545 US at 310. 
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courts.277 Moreover, these concerns link up to those that the 
Court has used in the past as grounds to refuse to hear claims 
through various forms of abstention. Specifically, in the cases of 
Railroad Commission of Texas v Pullman Co,278 Burford v Sun 
Oil Co,279 and Louisiana Power & Light Co v City of 
Thibodaux,280 the Court fashioned atextual rules to avoid hear-
ing cases that would be heard in state court for the purpose of, 
inter alia, avoiding “friction” between state and federal courts.281 
In these and related cases,282 the Court essentially defers to the 
state courts—at least for some time—so that the states can han-
dle their own business. For this reason, abstention has been de-
scribed as a form of “judicial federalism”283—it is a prime exam-
ple of a federal court ceding authority to a state court so as not 
to upset the balance between the two.  
In this way, intersystemic floodgates arguments bear some 
resemblance to the kinds of analytic moves that the Court has 
already made. Both involve deciding a case in a particular way 
so as to avoid creating a tension with the state courts, and ulti-
mately, upsetting the balance between the federal and state 
 
 277 See Gregory v Ashcroft, 501 US 452, 457–58 (1991): 
As every schoolchild learns, our Constitution establishes a system of dual sov-
ereignty between the States and the Federal Government. 
. . .  
Perhaps the principal benefit of the federalist system is a check on abuses of 
government power. . . . Just as the separation and independence of the coordi-
nate branches of the Federal Government serve to prevent the accumulation of 
excessive power in any one branch, a healthy balance of power between the 
States and the Federal Government will reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse 
from either front. 
 278 312 US 496 (1941). 
 279 319 US 315 (1943). 
 280 360 US 25 (1959). 
 281 James C. Rehnquist, Taking Comity Seriously: How to Neutralize the Abstention 
Doctrine, 46 Stan L Rev 1049, 1051 & n 6 (1994), citing Thibodaux, 360 US at 35 (Bren-
nan dissenting), Burford, 319 US at 335–36 (Douglas concurring), and Pullman, 312 US 
at 500. 
 282 See, for example, Younger v Harris, 401 US 37, 43–44, 54 (1971) (fashioning an 
abstention doctrine to protect the autonomy of proceedings in state court from federal 
interference). 
 283 Richard H. Fallon Jr, Why and How to Teach Federal Courts Today, 53 SLU L J 
693, 723 (2009) (“The Hart and Wechsler casebook styles the chapter on abstention doc-
trines as one on ‘Judicial Federalism.’ This label is apt: By abstaining, a federal court 
typically cedes authority to a state court, and considerations of federalism will some-
times weigh heavily in favor of a federal court’s doing so.”). See also Ernest A. Young, 
“The Ordinary Diet of the Law”: The Presumption against Preemption in the Roberts 
Court, 2011 S Ct Rev 253, 315 n 332 (describing the judicial abstention doctrines as 
“based on broad notions of federalism”).  
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court systems. Again, this analogy has its limits, and the point 
is certainly not that floodgates arguments made in the service of 
intersystemic concerns should always prevail in court. Rather, 
the point is simply that these arguments fit within an estab-
lished area of doctrine. Accordingly, as with floodgates argu-
ments in the judicial-executive context, intersystemic floodgates 
arguments have a prima facie claim to legitimacy.  
Ultimately the question of whether the use of other-
regarding floodgates arguments can be justified is a complicated 
one. The way to begin to answer the question is to look to con-
text—specifically, the institutions and the underlying concerns 
about those institutions at stake. When framed this way, the 
kinds of floodgates arguments that have arisen in the judicial-
legislative context can best be understood as fitting comfortably 
with familiar themes in statutory interpretation. Accordingly, 
their consideration is easily defensible. The kinds of floodgates 
arguments that have arisen in the judicial-executive and inter-
systemic contexts are arguably somewhat more difficult to em-
brace. That said, other areas of the law—namely qualified im-
munity and abstention—serve as prime examples of the Court 
intervening, on its own, to protect other government actors from 
harmful litigation and to preserve the relationship between the 
state and federal courts more generally. By analogy, these kinds 
of floodgates arguments too have a legitimate basis. In short, by 
recognizing that other-regarding floodgates arguments fit within 
established areas of doctrine and practice, it becomes clear that 
the Court should be able to entertain or even raise such argu-
ments on its own.  
B. Court-Centered Concerns 
As the earlier Parts have demonstrated, floodgates argu-
ments that express court-centered concerns are fundamentally 
different from those that express interbranch or intersystemic 
concerns. While the latter are concerned with other governmen-
tal institutions and the Court’s relationship with those institu-
tions, the former are self-regarding or even “self-interested” to 
borrow a phrase from Justice Blackmun,284 in that the Court 
considers them in the context of how federal courts themselves 
will be impacted by an increase in litigation. Moreover, with 
other-regarding floodgates arguments, the concern is not about 
 
 284 McMillian, 503 US at 15 (Blackmun concurring). 
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case volume per se, but rather that an increase in cases will 
show that congressional will was disregarded or will mean keep-
ing members of the executive branch from performing their offi-
cial obligations. By contrast, the concern with court-centered 
floodgates arguments is precisely about volume—that the feder-
al courts will have additional cases to decide (which is, of course, 
precisely their official obligation).  
To be sure, judicial workload is a critical concern. As noted 
earlier, the lower courts have faced rising caseloads over the last 
several decades285—a fact the justices have emphasized.286 To-
day, both federal district and appellate judges must contend 
with hundreds of filings per year,287 meaning that their ability to 
give attention to individual cases is greatly reduced. Employing 
the tools at hand, district judges have come to rely more heavily 
on the aid of magistrate judges,288 and appellate judges have 
come to rely on the assistance of staff attorneys and other 
case-management tools to cope with their workload.289 Still, 
judges and scholars alike have called for an expansion of the 
bench290 and limiting the flow of cases291 to alleviate the strain on 
the federal courts. Thus, when the justices express their desire 
to avoid inviting new claims into federal courts, the underlying 
concern is not a trivial one.292 The critical question, though, is 
 
 285 See notes 148–49 and accompanying text. See also Marin K. Levy, Judicial At-
tention as a Scarce Resource: A Preliminary Defense of How Judges Allocate Time across 
Cases in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 81 Geo Wash L Rev 401, 407–09 (2013). 
 286 See, for example, Bivens, 403 US at 428 (Black dissenting) (describing how the 
courts are “choked with lawsuits”).  
 287 See note 151. 
 288 See generally Tim A. Baker, The Expanding Role of Magistrate Judges in the 
Federal Courts, 39 Valp U L Rev 661 (2005) (discussing the increased role of magistrate 
judges).  
 289 See Levy, 61 Duke L J at 320–25 (cited in note 35). 
 290 See Stephen Reinhardt, Developing the Mission: Another View, 27 Conn L Rev 
877, 880 (1995); William M. Richman and William L. Reynolds, Elitism, Expediency, and 
the New Certiorari: Requiem for the Learned Hand Tradition, 81 Cornell L Rev 273, 299 
(1996). 
 291 See generally Henry J. Friendly, Averting the Flood by Lessening the Flow, 59 
Cornell L Rev 634 (1974) (outlining various ways the case flow to the courts could be re-
duced, including creating a Court of Tax Appeals and eliminating diversity jurisdiction). 
See also Richard A. Posner, The Federal Courts: Crisis and Reform 176 (Harvard 1985); 
Wilfred Feinberg, Is Diversity Jurisdiction an Idea Whose Time Has Passed?, 61 NY Bar 
J 14, 14–15 (July 1989); Edith H. Jones, Book Review, Back to the Future for Federal 
Appeals Courts: Rationing Federal Justice by Recovering Limited Jurisdiction, 73 Tex L 
Rev 1485, 1501–03 (1995); Jon O. Newman, Restructuring Federal Jurisdiction: Pro-
posals to Preserve the Federal Judicial System, 56 U Chi L Rev 761, 771–76 (1989).  
 292 Several Justices have described the problems attendant with a high caseload. 
See United States v Timmreck, 441 US 780, 784 (1979) (“[I]ncreasing the volume of judicial 
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whether considerations of judicial workload can stand as an in-
dependent factor in shaping the Court’s interpretation of sub-
stantive law. 
As with evaluating other floodgates arguments, one way to 
begin to assess the normative validity of self-regarding flood-
gates arguments is to ask whether the argument in question has 
ties to a particular constitutional principle or resembles estab-
lished areas of doctrine and practice. Ultimately, the answer 
seems to be no. Unlike the arguments raised in the interbranch 
and intersystemic contexts, those raised here have neither clear 
constitutional support nor close theoretical or doctrinal ana-
logues. Accordingly, reliance on these arguments requires some 
sort of affirmative justification—a justification that the justices 
have yet to produce.  
 Beginning with constitutional principles, it is unclear just 
what provision in the constitution could justify using workload 
concerns as an independent basis to alter substantive law or de-
cline to hear a case. Perhaps in extreme situations—for exam-
ple, if a particular interpretation of a statute would create hun-
dreds of thousands of new claims each year—the Court might be 
able to appeal to Article III itself. The rationale would be that 
such a decision would effectively amount to halting the function-
ing of the judiciary—arguably a violation of the Constitution’s 
provision for a federal court system.293 Short of this kind of cata-
strophic scenario, however, it is difficult to determine how the 
Court could justify altering its interpretation of substantive law 
with reference to a constitutional principle. 
It is likewise difficult to discern just how court-centered 
floodgates arguments could be grounded in established doctrine 
and practice. To be sure, the Court has occasionally decided cas-
es in particular ways out of fear of potential consequences. But 
even when examining the closest examples of these sorts of 
 
work, inevitably delays and impairs the orderly administration of justice.”), quoting 
United States v Smith, 440 F2d 521, 528–29 (7th Cir 1971) (Stevens dissenting); Bivens, 
403 US at 429 (Black dissenting) (“Many criminal defendants do not receive speedy trials 
and neither society nor the accused are assured of justice when inordinate delays occur”); 
Stern, 131 S Ct at 2630 (Breyer dissenting) (defining the problems of increased litigation 
as “inefficiency, increased cost, delay, and needless additional suffering among [the 
parties]”). 
 293 Specifically, Article III states that: “The judicial Power of the United States, 
shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may 
from time to time ordain and establish.” As the Court itself has said, “Article III creates 
. . . a judicial department composed of ‘inferior Courts’ and ‘one supreme Court.’” Plaut v 
Spendthrift Farm, Inc, 514 US 211, 227 (1995) (emphasis omitted).  
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prudential cases, it is still evident that court-centered floodgates 
arguments have no true analogue.  
One line of cases that could at first seem promising for 
grounding floodgates arguments are those based on institutional 
capacity concerns. In these cases, the justices’ concern that a 
particular holding will take them outside of their institutional 
competency directly affects the outcome of the case. A prime ex-
ample of this kind of case is San Antonio Independent School 
District v Rodriguez,294 which involved an Equal Protection chal-
lenge to Texas’s system for funding its public schools.295 The ma-
jority acknowledged that its concerns about institutional compe-
tency—such as its lack of knowledge about local taxation 
schemes and school management—affected its interpretation of 
the Equal Protection Clause (and subsequent decision that Tex-
as’s funding scheme did not violate the Clause).296 On the sur-
face, this kind of institutional capacity argument could appear to 
be similar to a court-centered floodgates argument. After all, 
both involve the Court interpreting substantive law in a particu-
lar way so as to avoid giving the federal courts certain kinds of 
obligations.  
And yet, there are quite plainly critical differences between 
the two types of arguments. Specifically, the two have funda-
mentally different animating concerns. While it is true that the 
Court in a case like Rodriguez is concerned with the kind of ad-
ditional work the lower courts would have to take on, the prima-
ry reason for this concern is that such work would amount to 
getting into the weeds of a state public school and taxation sys-
tem, forcing the courts to encroach upon the territory of the leg-
islature. In the words of Justice Powell, “[t]he consideration and 
initiation of fundamental reforms with respect to state taxation 
and education are matters reserved for the legislative processes 
of the various States, and we do no violence to the values of fed-
eralism and separation of powers by staying our hand.”297  
What these comments help show is that this type of institu-
tional capacity argument is, at least largely, other regarding. 
The underlying concern is that by deciding a case in a particular 
 
 294 411 US 1 (1973).  
 295 Id at 4–6. 
 296 Id at 41–44. See also Lawrence G. Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Un-
derenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 Harv L Rev 1212, 1218 (1978); Goodwin Liu, Edu-
cation, Equality, and National Citizenship, 116 Yale L J 330, 338 (2006). 
 297 Rodriguez, 411 US at 58.  
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way, the courts will be forced to go outside of their areas of ex-
pertise and necessarily encroach upon the territory of another 
branch of government in that specific case. This is simply a fun-
damentally different concern than that the courts’ own workload 
could become too great because of a subsequent increase in the 
volume of cases.  
A second line of prudential cases—those based on concerns 
about the Court’s legitimacy—arguably comes closer to ground-
ing court-centered floodgates arguments, but still remains ana-
lytically distinct. In these cases, the Court relies upon concerns 
about maintaining its own legitimacy as an independent pru-
dential factor in reaching a decision. The most direct example of 
this kind of argument can be seen in Planned Parenthood of 
Southeastern Pennsylvania v Casey,298 in which Justices 
O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter suggested that maintaining the 
Court’s legitimacy was a valid reason to avoid overruling past 
precedent (and indeed, why the Court let its prior decision in 
Roe v Wade299 stand).300 Once again, on the surface, one can see 
parallels between this kind of argument and court-centered 
floodgates arguments. Both involve the Court reaching a partic-
ular decision out of what is arguably institutional self-interest.  
 That said, there is still a significant space between these 
two types of arguments. The Court has only openly301 appealed 
to legitimacy concerns when it has claimed—as in Casey—that 
the power of the institution was truly at stake.302 In the words of 
the plurality, overruling their prior decision in Roe absent “the 
most compelling reason” would “subvert the Court’s legitimacy 
beyond any serious question.”303 With court-centered floodgates 
arguments, the concern is not nearly so severe. Despite the fact 
that the justices speak of “opening the floodgates,” the sugges-
tion from the cases is that, at worst, there will be a problematic 
accretion of cases (and therefore of work) over time, but not that 
 
 298 505 US 833 (1992). 
 299 410 US 113 (1973). 
 300 Casey, 505 US at 865–69. 
 301 There have been other decisions that commentators and scholars have consid-
ered to be influenced at least partially by a desire to enhance the Court’s legitimacy—
most recently Sebelius. See, for example, A.E. Dick Howard, Out of Infancy: The Roberts 
Court at Seven, 98 Va L Rev In Brief 76, 89–90 (2012).  
 302 Casey, 505 US at 867. See also Richard H. Fallon Jr, Marbury and the Constitu-
tional Mind: A Bicentennial Essay on the Wages of Doctrinal Tension, 91 Cal L Rev 1, 
27–28 (2003); Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991 Term—Foreword: The 
Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 Harv L Rev 22, 70–71 (1992).  
 303 Casey, 505 US at 867. 
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the courts will imminently face a true catastrophe. Again, short 
of a decision that would result in a cataclysmic situation for the 
courts—say by leading to tens or hundreds of thousands of new 
claims—court-centered floodgates arguments are clearly distinct 
from those based on the Court’s own legitimacy as voiced in 
Casey.  
In short, while one could readily identify related doctrine or 
even constitutional principles in the context of other-regarding 
floodgates arguments that suggested the consideration of these 
arguments was legitimate, the same cannot be said of floodgates 
arguments in the court-centered context. With this latter set, it 
is unclear just what kind of legal footing, if any, these argu-
ments could have. Accordingly, these arguments need some sort 
of affirmative normative justification—a justification that the 
justices have yet to offer. Until such a justification can be of-
fered, the Court should be wary of considering court-centered 
floodgates concerns in shaping the “requirements of law.”304 
Now, it is important to recognize that counseling Courts 
against considering caseload volume in this kind of decision 
making does not mean that there is no recourse when it comes to 
docket concerns. Our system provides several ways to relieve 
caseload pressure short of the courts not recognizing causes of 
action or deciding not to hear particular sets of cases. Specifical-
ly, our constitutional system gives Congress the authority to ad-
just laws so as to stem that flow.305 And Congress has indeed ex-
ercised that power. As noted earlier, Congress passed the 
Supreme Court Case Selections Act306 to alleviate the Court’s 
then “unmanageable workload” by eliminating most of the 
Court’s mandatory jurisdiction.307 With respect to the rest of the 
federal court docket, Congress has repeatedly enacted targeted 
legislation to reduce frivolous filings. For example, Congress 
passed the PLRA precisely as a way of “addressing a flood of 
prisoner litigation in the federal courts.”308 Similarly, part of the 
purpose of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 
1995309 was to limit frivolous securities claims.310 This is not to 
 
 304 Palmer, 468 US at 554 n 30 (Stevens concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
 305 Furthermore, Congress, of course, has the power to create additional judgeships, 
which would serve to reduce the burden on any single judge. 
 306 Pub L No 100-352, 102 Stat 662. 
 307 See Watts, 160 U Penn L Rev at 13–14 (cited in note 152). 
 308 Woodford v Ngo, 548 US 81, 91–92 n 2 (2006). 
 309 Pub L No 104-67, 109 Stat 737, codified at 15 USC § 78(a) et se q. 
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suggest that Congress could not do more in this vein; rather the 
point is simply that there is still a branch of government that 
has the clear authority to take the courts’ caseload into account 
in substantive decision making and has done so repeatedly in 
the past. 
This does not leave the courts defenseless against the rising 
tide, however; they have many tools besides substantive law 
with which to keep themselves afloat. Perhaps most prominent-
ly, both the district courts and the courts of appeals can avail 
themselves of various procedural rules to help cope with, and 
indeed limit, their dockets. Most plainly, the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure employ what have been called three basic pre-
trial “discouragement mechanisms.”311 The first mechanism is 
the pleading stage itself, with the possibility for a motion to 
dismiss. Although pleadings obviously have several purposes, 
scholars have come to identify a significant one as “allowing a 
court to screen cases for merit.”312 At this juncture, courts can si-
phon off some of the frivolous cases that come before them. The 
second mechanism is summary judgment. The main goal of Rule 
56 has been said to be “filtering out cases not worthy of trial,”313 
and that rule is now regarded as a “powerful tool for judges to 
control dockets.”314 A third mechanism is the possibility of Rule 
11 sanctions, which were developed to “punish lawyers for ad-
vancing meritless contentions that wasted the courts’ atten-
tion”315 and to deter such litigation from coming into court in the 
first place.316 In short, the district courts have at their disposal 
 
 310 Securities Litigation Reform: Conference Report to Accompany HR 1058, HR Conf 
Rep No 104-369, 104th Cong, 1st Sess 44 (1995). 
 311 Martin B. Louis, Intercepting and Discouraging Doubtful Litigation: A Golden 
Anniversary View of Pleading, Summary Judgment, and Rule 11 Sanctions under the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 67 NC L Rev 1023, 1033–34 (1989). 
 312 David L. Noll, The Indeterminacy of Iqbal, 99 Georgetown L J 117, 123 (2010). 
See also Adam N. Steinman, The Pleading Problem, 62 Stan L Rev 1293, 1347 (2010) 
(“Scholars have broken down the purpose of pleadings in a number of different ways, but 
they might broadly be characterized as: notice-giving, process-facilitating, and merits-
screening.”). 
 313 Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the “Litigation Explosion,” 
“Liability Crisis,” and Efficiency Clichés Eroding Our Day in Court and Jury Trial 
Commitments?, 78 NYU L Rev 982, 1041 (2003).  
 314 Id at 1056. 
 315 Paul D. Carrington, Politics and Civil Procedure Rulemaking: Reflections on Ex-
perience, 60 Duke L J 597, 611 (2010). 
 316 FRCP 11, Advisory Committee Notes to the 1983 Amendments (“Greater atten-
tion by the district courts to pleading and motion abuses and the imposition of sanctions 
when appropriate, should discourage dilatory or abusive tactics and help to streamline 
the litigation process by lessening frivolous claims or defenses.”). 
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several critical procedural rules that have been fashioned, at 
least in part, so that district courts can more quickly dispose of 
frivolous filings and streamline the litigation process more 
generally. 
Many of the mechanisms that exist at the district court level 
have analogues at the courts of appeals. Through the Federal 
Rules of Appellate Procedure, the circuit courts have several key 
ways to manage their dockets and reduce the time taken by friv-
olous filings. Rule 34 permits appeals courts to decide cases 
without oral argument317—a powerful time-saving mechanism.318 
Additionally, courts of appeals can rely on staff attorneys to help 
draft summary dispositions.319 Finally, per Rule 38, if a court of 
appeals determines that a particular filing was frivolous, the 
court can award damages and costs to the appellee.320 
Moreover, these mechanisms of the federal courts are not 
static—if they are insufficient to curb the flow of frivolous cases, 
they can be altered, and indeed have been so altered in the past. 
Rule 34, for example, was amended in 1979 to authorize the res-
olution of an appeal without oral argument whenever a panel 
agrees that argument is unnecessary because, inter alia, an ap-
peal is frivolous.321 Similarly, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 
was amended in 1983 precisely to reduce the number of frivolous 
filings.322  
And although this has been more controversial, the Su-
preme Court itself has shifted the meaning of various procedural 
rules in its own opinions.323 In 1986, the Court in a trilogy of cas-
es324 solidified Rule 56 as “a powerful tool for the early resolution 
 
 317 See FRAP 34.  
 318 See Levy, 61 Duke L J at 323, 345–46 (cited in note 35). See also Honorable J. 
Clifford Wallace, Improving the Appellate Process Worldwide through Maximizing Judi-
cial Resources, 38 Vand J Transnatl L 187, 200 (2005) (“The amount of time saved by 
foregoing oral argument is significant.”). 
 319 Wallace, 38 Vand J Transnatl L at 196–98 (cited in note 318).  
 320 See FRAP 38. 
 321 See FRAP 34, Advisory Committee Notes to the 1979 Amendments. 
 322 FRCP 11, Advisory Committee Notes to the 1983 Amendment. 
 323 See, for example, Joseph A. Seiner, Plausibility beyond the Complaint, 53 Wm & 
Mary L Rev 987, 1014 (2012) (describing the Court’s decisions in Twombly and Iqbal as 
“enormously controversial”), citing Bell Atlantic Corp v Twombly, 550 US 544 (2007) and 
Ashcroft v Iqbal, 556 US 662 (2009); Robert G. Bone, Plausibility Pleading Revisited and 
Revised: A Comment on Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 85 Notre Dame L Rev 849, 883–84 (2010) (cri-
tiquing Iqbal on the ground that changes to pleading standards should be made through 
the Rules Enabling Act or Congress, not the Court). 
 324 Celotex Corp v Catrett, 477 US 317 (1986); Anderson v Liberty Lobby, Inc, 477 US 
242 (1986); Matsushita Electric Industrial Co v Zenith Radio Corp, 475 US 574 (1986). 
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of litigation.”325 And of course, more recently, the Court altered 
pleadings with its decisions in Bell Atlantic Corp v Twombly326 
and Ashcroft v Iqbal.327 There can be disagreement about the 
propriety of the way these rules have shifted over time, but the 
point remains that the federal courts have an extensive set of 
procedures to manage their dockets, and these procedures can 
be ratcheted up if they prove insufficient. 
What this discussion suggests is that, when compared to 
floodgates arguments that express interbranch and intersystem-
ic concerns, those that express court-centered concerns are on 
significantly shakier ground. Barring a true flood of tens or 
hundreds of thousands of cases, no evident principle exists to 
support the Court taking workload concerns into account when 
engaging in “[i]nterpretation of the law.”328 Therefore, although 
the Court may have a legitimate interest in ensuring that the 
number of filings, and particularly frivolous filings, does not be-
come too high, it should be wary of using substantive law as the 
limiting device. Speaking of unmeritorious cases in particular, 
Justice Stevens has argued, “Frivolous cases should be treated 
as exactly that, and not as occasions for fundamental shifts in 
legal doctrine. Our legal system has developed procedures for 
speedily disposing of unfounded claims; if they are inadequate 
. . . then there is something wrong with those procedures, not 
with the law.”329 Accordingly, the Court should have a presump-
tion against using court-centered floodgates arguments. The 
problems of case flow should be addressed through case man-
agement and, more broadly, the tools of Congress. 
This discussion leads to another question: Does the pre-
sumption against court-centered floodgates arguments extend to 
cases in which the Court is essentially engaging in federal com-
mon lawmaking? One could imagine that although it is difficult 
 
 325 Miller, 78 NYU L Rev at 984 (cited in note 313). It is worth noting that according 
to several empirical studies, in almost all categories of cases the summary judgment 
rates began to increase prior to the Court’s decision in the trilogy of cases. See generally 
Joe S. Cecil, et al, A Quarter-Century of Summary Judgment Practice in Six Federal Dis-
trict Courts, 4 J Empirical Legal Stud 861 (2007); Stephen B. Burbank, Vanishing Trials 
and Summary Judgment in Federal Civil Cases: Drifting toward Bethlehem or Gomor-
rah?, 1 J Empirical Legal Stud 591 (2004). 
 326 550 US 544 (2007).  
 327 556 US 662 (2009).  
 328 Legal Services Corp v Velazquez, 531 US 533, 545 (2001) (“Interpretation of the 
law and the Constitution is the primary mission of the judiciary when it acts within the 
sphere of its authority to resolve a case or controversy.”). 
 329 Hoover v Ronwin, 466 US 558, 601 (1984) (Stevens dissenting).  
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to justify the Court using workload concerns as a reason to alter 
its interpretation of substantive law, the Court could legitimate-
ly take that same consideration into account when its role is to 
make a policy judgment rather than interpret the law, as in the 
Bivens line of cases.330 After all, if the goal of the Court in this 
context is simply to make good law, then the consideration of fu-
ture litigation might well be relevant in the determination of 
what constitutes a good law. 
The normative assessment of floodgates arguments thus far 
has been partially relativistic—some arguments are more or less 
easily defensible when compared to others, and a court-centered 
argument in this context is no exception. Considering workload 
in a policy context is easier to justify than using court-centered 
floodgates concerns as stand-alone grounds for a decision, but it 
is not altogether unproblematic. To borrow another legal trope, 
one concern is based on a slippery slope. If the Court relies on 
floodgates considerations in a policy-making context, these same 
concerns are more likely to bleed into its substantive analysis in 
other cases. But the greater point may be that, in light of the 
various legitimate options for managing caseload that are open 
to the judiciary, even when engaging in policy analysis it might 
be preferable for the Court to shy away from using caseload as a 
reason to shift the direction of the law. 
C. Empirical Concerns 
The outset of this Part poses several normative questions 
about floodgates arguments, including whether it is ever appro-
priate for courts to consider the effect their decision will have on 
the volume of litigation and if so, how many cases are necessary 
to create an impermissible flood in any given context. The pre-
ceding Sections have tried to frame and begin to answer the first 
of these questions, suggesting that the use of other-regarding 
floodgates arguments is generally defensible, whereas the Court 
should be wary of relying on court-centered floodgates argu-
ments, particularly when outside the policy-making context. 
This Section turns to the second of these questions—what pre-
cisely is needed to make the case for an oncoming flood? It is im-
portant to recognize that answering this question, in turn, in-
volves a critical two part task: a court must not only forecast the 
amount of litigation (a more or less empirical proposition) but 
 
 330 See note 173. 
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also say why that amount would constitute a flood instead of a 
permissible flow. It is worth briefly considering each task here. 
Beginning with the purely empirical component, the preced-
ing discussion reveals that the justices often invoke floodgates 
arguments without much support for why they believe a large 
number of cases will come. In Bivens, Justice Blackmun sug-
gested that the Court’s decision would “open[ ] the door for an-
other avalanche of new federal cases” on the theory that 
“[w]henever a suspect imagines, or chooses to assert, that a 
Fourth Amendment right has been violated, he will now imme-
diately sue the federal officer in federal court”331 and nothing 
more. In Solem, Chief Justice Burger claimed that the Court’s 
decision to hold the petitioner’s sentence unconstitutional would 
lead to a “flood” of new cases with no additional support.332  
Of course, it can be easy to hide one’s claims behind this 
kind of hyperbole—and there is reason to suspect that parties 
and justices have invoked this language at times precisely be-
cause, in the words of Justice Powell, a “‘floodgates’ argument 
can be easy to make and difficult to rebut.”333 But if a particular 
decision is made to avoid an influx of cases that could harm a 
coordinate branch of government or state court, then it should 
be based on something more than the suggestion that an “ava-
lanche” or “flood” is imminent. 
Forecasting the number of cases that will follow a decision 
is no easy task and may be near impossible in some cases. For 
example, if one of the justices had been willing to accept the 
basic principle of President Clinton’s argument in Jones, that 
justice then would have needed to show why a decision by the 
Court not to stay civil litigation against the President would 
“spawn” a host of new litigation334—a particularly difficult un-
dertaking given the sui generis nature of the case. But outside of 
a unique case such as Jones, we should expect the justices to 
have some extended discussion about why they think a flood is 
likely to come. This reasoning could be based on past experience 
with the same kind of claims, as in Michigan Academy of Family 
Physicians335 and Skinner,336 or experience with comparable 
 
 331 Bivens, 403 US at 430 (Blackmun dissenting). 
 332 Solem, 463 US at 315 (Burger dissenting). 
 333 Rummel v Estelle, 445 US 263, 304 (1980) (Powell dissenting). 
 334 Jones, 520 US at 701–02. 
 335 Michigan Academy of Family Physicians, 476 US at 680–81 n 11 (“We observed 
no flood of litigation in the first 20 years of operation of Part B of the Medicare program, 
and we seriously doubt that we will be inundated in the future.”). 
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claims, as in Bivens.337 Now to be clear, the point of this pre-
scription is not to encourage the justices to become empiricists 
(an important caveat given that there will certainly be skepti-
cism about the ability of the Court to make these kinds of fore-
casts even outside the most challenging cases338). Rather, the 
point is that if claims about increases in litigation are to influ-
ence at least some decisions, the justices need to provide support 
for those claims—both for each other and for the public.  
Second, it is important to recognize that the final part of the 
Court’s task goes beyond mere forecasting. A floodgates argu-
ment rests on a claim about how many cases would follow a par-
ticular decision, but then also a claim about why that number 
would actually create a burden. Hypothetically, the Court could 
accurately predict the number of new cases that will stem from 
the case before it—be it, say, one thousand or even ten thousand 
per year—yet this number still must be set in context. Specifi-
cally, the justices must still make a determination about wheth-
er the figure will truly be problematic.  
To see how challenging this can be, one need only look to a 
recent study of Bivens cases—one of the sets of cases that con-
cerned the Court. The study showed that between 2001 and 
2003, Bivens suits constituted 243 out of 143,092 civil filings in 
five district courts.339 Do 243 filings rise to the level of a flood 
within these district courts? It is difficult to say. But if a justice 
claims that it does, then that justice should make that case, pre-
sumably based on context-specific information, such as how 
much time these cases consume and ultimately the extent to 
which they tend to prevent law enforcement officials from per-
forming their jobs.  
 
 336 Skinner, 131 S Ct at 1299 (“In the Circuits that currently allow § 1983 claims for 
DNA testing, no evidence tendered . . . shows any litigation flood or even rainfall.”) (cita-
tion omitted). 
 337 Bivens, 403 US at 391 n 4 (“In estimating the magnitude of any such ‘avalanche,’ 
it is worth noting that a survey of comparable actions against state officers under . . . 
§ 1983 found only 53 reported cases in 17 years (1951–1967) that survived a motion to 
dismiss.”).  
 338 See, for example, Sanford Levinson and Jack M. Balkin, What Are the Facts of 
Marbury v. Madison?, 20 Const Commen 255, 281 & n 74 (2003) (suggesting that one 
might “think that judges are not particularly good at predicting the future consequences 
of their decisions”).  
 339 See Reinert, 62 Stan L Rev at 837 (cited in note 154). Specifically, Professor Al-
exander Reinert noted that fifty-one Bivens actions were filed in the Southern District of 
New York, sixty-seven in the Eastern District of New York, sixty-four in the Southern 
District of Texas, twenty-three in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, and thirty-eight 
in the Northern District of Illinois between 2001 and 2003. Id.  
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In short, even when the consideration of a particular type of 
floodgates argument is generally defensible, an individual ar-
gument can still be problematic as employed. This discussion 
has shown that when the justices invoke floodgates arguments, 
they often do so without much support for why a flood will come 
or why a particular high-water mark is problematic. While these 
areas are ripe for further scholarly exploration, at the very least 
one can conclude at this juncture that if the justices are to con-
tinue to put forward these arguments, they should do more on 
both fronts. 
CONCLUSION 
When the Court first consistently began using floodgates 
rhetoric in the mid-1940s, little did it know that it would be 
opening the floodgates of floodgates arguments themselves. 
Since 2000, the justices have considered floodgates arguments in 
nearly thirty cases, with fourteen coming from the last few years 
alone.340 This flood shows no sign of receding anytime soon. 
In light of the Court’s consistent—and even increasing—
discussion of floodgates arguments, exploring and understand-
ing them is vital. Though courts and scholars often refer to “the 
floodgates argument” as if it had a singular, stable meaning, it 
can be invoked in various ways, depending upon who is being 
flooded, the effect of that flood, and what the flood contains. As 
this Article has demonstrated, the Court has considered flood-
gates arguments made to avoid unduly burdening the executive, 
encroaching upon the legislature, or upsetting the balance be-
tween the federal and state courts. These are common concerns 
that the Court often encounters, and they have ties to the prin-
ciples of separation of powers and federalism, as well as the doc-
trines of qualified immunity and abstention. Although the jus-
tices should take care to support claims that a flood will truly 
ensue when making other-regarding floodgates arguments, the 
use of such arguments is generally defensible. 
The same cannot be said for court-centered floodgates ar-
guments—those arguments in which the Court is concerned 
about its own workload and the workload of the rest of the judi-
ciary. Although the caseload of the federal courts is a critical is-
sue, attempts to reduce it through the interpretation of substan-
tive law raise serious concerns. Short of a catastrophic situation, 
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anxieties about caseload would do well to be addressed through 
Congress and the lower courts’ case-management tools. 
Ultimately, what seemed to be an innocuous line of argu-
mentation implicated broad questions about when the Court 
should consider the consequences of its decisions, how the Court 
should engage with empirics, and what measures the Court can 
undertake to ensure its own ability to administer justice. These 
and related questions all deserve sustained scholarly and judi-
cial consideration. But based on this preliminary analysis, it is 
clear that the justices should guard their own decisions to en-
sure that workload concerns, as manifested in the court-centered 
floodgates arguments above, do not spill over into the substan-
tive analysis of law. 
